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This research advances the hypothesis and establishes empirically that interpersonal
population diversity, rather than fractionalization or polarization across ethnic groups,
has been pivotal to the emergence, prevalence, recurrence, and severity of intraso-
cietal conflicts. Exploiting an exogenous source of variations in population diversity
across nations and ethnic groups, as determined predominantly during the exodus of
humans from Africa tens of thousands of years ago, the study demonstrates that pop-
ulation diversity, and its impact on the degree of diversity within ethnic groups, has
contributed significantly to the risk and intensity of historical and contemporary civil
conflicts. The findings arguably reflect the contribution of population diversity to the
non-cohesiveness of society, as reflected partly in the prevalence of mistrust, the di-
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vergence in preferences for public goods and redistributive policies, and the degree of
fractionalization and polarization across ethnic, linguistic, and religious groups.
KEYWORDS: Social conflict, civil conflict, population diversity, ethnic fractionaliza-
tion, ethnic polarization, interpersonal trust, political preferences.
1. INTRODUCTION
OVER THE COURSE of the 20th century, in the period following World War II, civil con-
flicts have been responsible for more than 16 million casualties worldwide, well surpassing
the cumulative loss of human life associated with international conflicts. Nations plagued
by civil conflict have experienced significant fatalities from violence, substantial loss of
productive resources, and considerable declines in their standards of living. While the
number of countries experiencing conflict has declined from its peak in the early 1990s,
as many as 35 nations have been afflicted by the prevalence of civil conflict since 2010,
and more than a quarter of all nations experienced an internal armed conflict for at least
a decade during the 1960–2017 time period.
This research explores the origins of the prevailing variation in the emergence, preva-
lence, recurrence, and severity of intrasocietal conflicts across countries, regions, and eth-
nic groups. It highlights one of their deepest roots, molded during the dawn of the dis-
persion of anatomically modern humans across the globe and its differential impact on
the level of population diversity across regions. The study advances the hypothesis and
establishes empirically that interpersonal diversity within each ethnic group, rather than
fractionalization or polarization across ethnic groups, is pivotal for the understanding of
civil conflicts. Exploiting an exogenous source of variations in population diversity across
nations and ethnic groups, as determined predominantly during the exodus of Homo sapi-
ens from Africa tens of thousands of years ago, the study establishes that interpersonal
population diversity, and its impact on the degree of diversity within ethnic groups, has
contributed significantly to conflicts in the course of human history. The study further sug-
gests that the contribution of interpersonal population diversity to the non-cohesiveness
of society, as reflected partly by the prevalence of mistrust, the divergence in preferences
for public goods and redistributive policies, and the degree of fractionalization and po-
larization across ethnic, linguistic, and religious groups, has fostered social, political, and
economic instability and magnified the vulnerability of society to internal conflicts.
Population diversity at the national or subnational level may contribute to intergroup as
well as intragroup conflicts through several mechanisms. First, population diversity may
have an adverse effect on the prevalence of mutual trust, and excessive diversity could
therefore depress the level of social capital below a threshold that could have averted the
emergence of social, political, and economic grievances and, thus, prevented violent hos-
tilities. Second, to the extent that population diversity captures interpersonal divergence
in preferences for public goods and redistributive policies, highly diverse societies may
find it difficult to reconcile such differences through collective action, thereby intensify-
ing their susceptibility to conflict. Third, insofar as population diversity reflects interper-
sonal heterogeneity in traits that are differentially rewarded, it can potentially cultivate
resentments that are rooted in inequality, thereby magnifying the vulnerability to internal
belligerence.
Moreover, the prehistorical variation in the level of population diversity across regions
and its potential role in facilitating the formation of ethnic groups may have contributed
to the emergence of social conflicts. In particular, following the “out of Africa” migration
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of humans, the initial endowment of population diversity in each region may have influ-
enced the process of group formation, reflecting the trade-off associated with the scale of
the population. While a larger group may benefit from economies of scale, its productivity
tends to be affected adversely by its incohesiveness. Thus, in light of the adverse impact
of diversity on social cohesiveness, a larger initial endowment of population diversity may
have plausibly led to the emergence of a larger number of groups, and, due to the forces
of “cultural drift” and “biased transmission” of cultural markers (e.g., traditions, norms,
and dialects), to the formation of distinct ethnic identities. The emergent fragmentation
could have fueled excessive intergroup competition and dissension, and could have cre-
ated fertile grounds for the use of a divide-and-rule strategy by political elites, thereby
contributing to conflict.
The exploration of the contribution of interpersonal population diversity to conflict
within nations and ethnic groups relies on a novel measure that encompasses various
dimensions of population diversity—proportional representation of ethnic groups, inter-
personal diversity between groups, and interpersonal diversity within groups. While some
aspects of population diversity at the national level can be captured by indices of eth-
nolinguistic fractionalization and polarization, these measures predominantly reflect the
proportional representation of ethnic groups in the population, disregarding the impor-
tance of the degree of interpersonal diversity within each ethnic group for the overall level
of diversity at the national level. These incomplete measures of population diversity may
thus obfuscate the true impact of population diversity on civil conflicts within nations, and
they do not permit the exploration of the role of diversity within an ethnic group on either
intragroup or intergroup conflicts.
Exploiting variations across countries and ethnic homelands, the analysis demonstrates
that interpersonal population diversity within and between ethnic groups has contributed
fundamentally—as illustrated in Figure 1—to the emergence, prevalence, recurrence, and
severity of historical and contemporary intrasocietal conflicts across countries, regions,
and ethnic groups. Furthermore, the country-level analysis documents that the contribu-
tion of population diversity to intrastate conflicts has plausibly operated partly via the
number of ethnic groups in the population, the prevalence of mistrust, and the degree of
dispersion in political preferences.
The dual analysis at the national and at the ethnic-homeland levels has several virtues.
First, it permits the exploration of the impact of population diversity on the emergence of
conflicts in societies of different scales, suggesting that population diversity reduces social
FIGURE 1.—The evolution of population diversity in a location and its impact on conflict. Notes: Solid arrows
represent hypothesized links that are confirmed by the empirical analysis, whereas dashed arrows represent
hypothesized links that do not gain consistent support. In particular, interpersonal diversity within as well as
between groups affect both intergroup and intragroup conflict, partly via their adverse effect on social cohesion
within and across ethnic groups.
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cohesion and increases the likelihood of social conflicts within national as well as subna-
tional populations. Second, since the boundaries of ethnic homelands largely predate the
formation of modern nation states, the ethnic-homeland-level analysis mitigates potential
concerns regarding the impact of population diversity and internal conflicts on contempo-
rary national borders (Alesina and Spolaore (2003)). Third, the focus on ethnic groups as
well as on national populations permits the analysis to disentangle the impact of popula-
tion diversity within an ethnic group, from the impact of ethnic diversity across groups, in
the emergence of intergroup as well as intragroup conflicts. Fourth, because populations
within ethnic homelands have been largely native to their locations, the analysis at the
ethnicity level diminishes potential concerns about the effect of conflicts on migrations
across countries and on the global distribution of national population diversity.
The research employs several empirical strategies to mitigate concerns about the poten-
tial role of reverse causality, omitted cultural, geographical, and human characteristics, as
well as sorting, in the observed association between population diversity and intrasoci-
etal conflicts. In the course of human history, conflicts have plausibly altered the observed
levels of diversity within ethnic groups, and the association between observed population
diversity within an ethnic group and intragroup conflict may partly reflect reverse causality
from conflict to diversity. Furthermore, the association between population diversity and
internal conflicts at the ethnicity level may be governed by omitted cultural, geographi-
cal, and human characteristics. In order to mitigate these concerns, the empirical analysis
exploits the negative association between the observed population diversity of an indige-
nous contemporary ethnic group and its migratory distance from East Africa, due to the
serial founder effect (e.g., Harpending and Rogers (2000), Ramachandran, Deshpande,
Roseman, Rosenberg, Feldman, and Cavalli-Sforza (2005), Ashraf and Galor (2013a)), to
predict population diversity for a globally representative sample of more than 900 ethnic
groups.1
Nevertheless, several scenarios could a priori weaken the credibility of this methodol-
ogy. First, selective migration out of Africa, or natural selection along the migratory paths,
could have affected human traits and, therefore, conflict independently of the impact of
migratory distance from Africa on the degree of diversity in human traits. However, while
migratory distance from Africa has a significant negative association with the degree of
diversity in human traits, it appears to be uncorrelated with the mean level of traits in
a population, such as height, weight, and skin reflectance, conditional on distance from
the equator (Ashraf and Galor (2013a)). Second, migratory distance from Africa could
be correlated with distances from focal historical locations (e.g., technological frontiers)
and could, therefore, capture the effect of these other distances on the process of de-
velopment and the emergence of conflicts, rather than the effect of these migratory dis-
tances via population diversity. Nevertheless, conditional on migratory distance from East
Africa, distances from historical technological frontiers in the years 1, 1000, and 1500 do
not qualitatively alter the impact of predicted diversity on internal conflicts, further jus-
tifying the reliance on the “out of Africa” hypothesis and the serial founder effect for
identifying the influence of population diversity on intrasocietal conflicts.
1The contemporary worldwide distribution of observed population diversity across indigenous ethnic groups
overwhelmingly reflects a serial founder effect—that is, a chain of ancient population bottlenecks—originating
in East Africa. In particular, because the spatial diffusion of humans to the rest of the world occurred in a step-
wise migration process beginning around 90,000–60,000 BP, where in each step, a subgroup of individuals left
their parental colony to establish a new settlement farther away, carrying with them only a subset of the diver-
sity of their parental colony, the population diversity of a prehistorically indigenous ethnic group as observed
today decreases with the distance along ancient human migratory paths from East Africa.
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Moreover, a threat to identification would emerge if the actual migratory paths from
Africa would have been correlated with geographical characteristics that are directly con-
ducive to conflict (e.g., soil quality, ruggedness, climatic conditions, and propensity to
trade). This would have involved, however, that the conduciveness of these geographical
characteristics to conflicts would be aligned along the main root of the migratory path out
of Africa as well as along each of the main forks that emerge from this primary path. In
particular, in several important forks of this migration process (e.g., the Fertile Crescent
and the associated eastward migration into Asia and westward migration into Europe),
geographical characteristics that are conducive to conflicts would have to diminish sym-
metrically along these divergent secondary migratory paths. Nevertheless, the analysis
establishes that the results are qualitatively unaffected when it accounts for a wide range
of potentially confounding geographical characteristics of ethnic homelands, spatial de-
pendence, as well as time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity in each region, identifying
the association between interpersonal population diversity and internal conflicts across
societies in the same region.
The observed association between population diversity and internal conflict at the
ethnic-homeland level may further reflect the sorting of less diverse populations into ge-
ographical niches that are less conducive to conflicts. While sorting would not affect the
existence of a positive association between population diversity and conflicts, it would
weaken the proposed interpretation of this association. However, such sorting would re-
quire that the spatial distribution of ex ante conflict risk would have to be negatively
correlated with migratory distance from Africa and the conduciveness of geographical
characteristics to conflicts would have to be negatively aligned with the primary migratory
path out of Africa as well as with each of the main subsequent forks and their associ-
ated secondary migratory paths. These concerns are further mitigated by accounting for
heterogeneity in a wide range of geographical characteristics across ethnic homelands,
spatial autocorrelation, and regional fixed effects.
Further, to the extent that interregional migration flows in the post-1500 era, and thus
the proportional representation of ethnic groups within each national population, may
have been affected by historically persistent spatial patterns of conflict risk, contemporary
national population diversity may be endogenous to intrastate conflicts. Thus, to mitigate
these concerns, two alternative empirical strategies are developed, yielding remarkably
similar results. The first strategy confines the analysis to variations in a sample of coun-
tries that only belong to the Old World (i.e., Africa, Europe, and Asia), where diversity
of contemporary national populations predominantly reflects the diversity of indigenous
populations that became native to their current locations well before the colonial era.
This strategy rests on the observation that post-1500 population movements within the
Old World did not result in the significant admixture of populations that were very dis-
tant from one another. The second strategy exploits variations in a globally representative
sample of countries using an estimator, in which the migratory distance of a country’s pre-
historically native population from East Africa is employed as an instrumental variable for
the diversity of its contemporary national population. It rests on the identifying assump-
tion that the migratory distance of a country’s prehistorically native population from East
Africa is exogenous to the risk of intrastate conflict faced by the country’s overall popula-
tion in the last half-century.
The empirical analysis at the country level establishes that, accounting for the poten-
tially confounding effects of geographical and institutional characteristics, ethnolinguistic
fragmentation, outcomes of economic development, and continent fixed effects, an in-
crease in national population diversity that corresponds to the movement from the 10th
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to the 90th percentile of its global cross-country distribution (i.e., a movement from the
diversity level of the Republic of Korea to that of the Democratic Republic of Congo) is
associated with 2.3 new civil conflict outbreaks during the 1960–2017 time period (relative
to a sample mean of 1.2 and a standard deviation of 1.7 new civil conflict outbreaks). In
addition, this increase in diversity is also associated with (i) an increase in the likelihood
of observing the incidence of civil conflict in any given 5-year interval during the 1960–
2017 period from 18 percent to 34 percent; (ii) an increase in the likelihood of observing
the onset of a new civil conflict in any given year during the 1960–2017 time period from
1 percent to 4 percent; (iii) an increase in the likelihood of observing the incidence of one
or more intragroup factional conflict events in any given year during the 1985–2006 time
period from 6 percent to 60 percent; and (iv) an increase in the intensity of social unrest
by either 26 percent or 38 percent of a standard deviation of the observed distribution of
intrastate conflict severity across countries in the post-1960 time period (depending on
the employed measure of intrastate conflict severity).
Similarly, the analysis at the ethnic-homeland level establishes that, accounting for the
potentially confounding influence of a wide range of geographical and historical factors,
outcomes of economic development, and regional fixed effects, an increase in observed
population diversity of an ethnic group from the 10th percentile (e.g., the Mamusi people
of Oceania) to the 90th percentile (e.g., the Pare people of Eastern Africa) of its global
distribution is associated with an increase in the prevalence of conflicts within the territory
of a homeland over the years 1989–2008 by 0.43 (relative to a sample mean of 0.14 and
a standard deviation of 0.27). Further, this change in ethnic population diversity is also
associated with an increase of about 57 conflict events, 9970 conflict-related deaths, and
948 deaths per conflict during the same time period.
2. RELATED LITERATURE
This study is related to several well-established lines of inquiry. Specifically, the paper
contributes to the vast literature on the determinants of civil conflict. The determinants
of civil conflict have been the focus of intensive research over the past two decades, high-
lighting the role of social, political, and economic grievances, along with the capability of
the state to subdue armed opposition groups, the conduciveness of geographical charac-
teristics towards rebel insurgencies, and the opportunity cost of engaging in rebellions,
among other contributing factors (Sambanis (2002), Fearon and Laitin (2003), Collier
and Hoeffler (2007), Blattman and Miguel (2010)). The present study advances the un-
derstanding of the nature of grievance-related mechanisms in civil conflict, emphasizing
the role of interpersonal population diversity and its deep determinants on the emergence
of intragroup as well as intergroup social divisions.
The role of fractionalization was initially at the forefront of empirical analyses of the
underlying determinants of civil conflict, in light of the conventional wisdom that inter-
group competition over ownership of productive resources and political power, along with
conflicting preferences for public goods and redistributive policies, are more difficult to
reconcile in societies that are fragmented ethnolinguistically. Nevertheless, early evidence
regarding the influence of ethnic, linguistic, and religious fractionalization on the risk of
civil conflict in society had been largely inconclusive (Fearon and Laitin (2003), Collier
and Hoeffler (2007)), arguably due in part to conceptual limitations associated with frac-
tionalization indices. The introduction of polarization indices to the analyses of civil con-
flict has led to more affirmative findings demonstrating that intergroup grievances are
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indeed contributors to the risk of civil conflict in society (Montalvo and Reynal-Querol
(2005), Esteban, Mayoral, and Ray (2012)).2
Nevertheless, measures of ethnolinguistic fragmentation are unable to account for the
potentially critical role of intragroup heterogeneity in augmenting the risk of conflict in
society at large. A central virtue of the proposed measure of population diversity is that
it captures the impact of diversity across individuals within ethnic groups. Furthermore,
even as a proxy for interethnic divisions, the proposed measure improves upon existing
proxies that are based on fractionalization and polarization indices. Specifically, the com-
monly used measures of ethnolinguistic fragmentation typically do not exploit informa-
tion beyond the proportional representations of ethnolinguistically differentiated groups
in the national population—namely, they implicitly assume that these ethnic groups are
internally homogeneous and culturally “equidistant” from one another.3 In contrast, the
proposed measure of national population diversity incorporates information on pairwise
intergroup genetic distances, as well as the genetic diversity within each ethnic group, as
determined predominantly over the course of the “out of Africa” diffusion of humans to
the rest of the globe tens of thousands of years ago.4
Moreover, the use of conventional measures of ethnolinguistic fragmentation in the
exploration of the impact of fragmentation on conflict is unsatisfactory due to plausi-
ble concerns about reverse causality and measurement error. Due to the association of
conflict with atrocities as well as voluntary and forced migrations, the degree of ethnolin-
guistic fractionalization is likely to be affected by past and potential conflicts. Although
the proposed measure of population diversity exploits information on the population
shares of subnational groups possessing ethnically differentiated ancestries, because the
endowment of population diversity in a given location was overwhelmingly determined
during the prehistoric “out of Africa” expansion of humans, the analysis is able to ex-
ploit a plausibly exogenous source of the contemporary cross-country variation in this
measure, thereby mitigating the biases associated with measurement and endogeneity is-
sues that plague the widely used proxies of ethnolinguistic fragmentation. Furthermore,
in contrast to the plausibly exogenous component of population diversity, the degree of
ethnolinguistic fragmentation may be systematically mismeasured in more conflict-prone
societies, due to (i) the political economy of national census categorizations of subna-
tional groups, and (ii) the endogenous constructivism of individual self-identification with
2However, in network-based models of conflict involving multiple groups (e.g., König, Rohner, Thoenig, and
Zilibotti (2017)), greater intergroup divergence could mitigate conflict propensity by reducing the strength of
intergroup network alliances within one side or another of such conflicts.
3More sophisticated measures of ethnolinguistic fragmentation—such as (i) the Greenberg index of “cul-
tural diversity,” as measured by Fearon (2003) and Desmet, Ortuño-Ortín, and Weber (2009), or (ii) the eth-
nolinguistic polarization index, as measured by Desmet, Ortuño-Ortín, and Weber (2009) and by Esteban,
Mayoral, and Ray (2012)—incorporate information on pairwise linguistic distances, wherein pairwise linguis-
tic proximity monotonically increases in the number of shared branches between any two languages in a hi-
erarchical linguistic tree. This information, however, is constrained by the nature of a hierarchical linguistic
tree, where languages residing at the same level of branching of the tree are necessarily equidistant from one
another.
4The genetic distance between any two ethnic groups in a contemporary national population predominantly
reflects the prehistoric migratory distance between their respective ancestral populations (from the precolonial
era), and as follows from the continuity of geographical distances, the proposed population diversity measure
captures continuous intergroup distances. Spolaore and Wacziarg (2016) documented a negative relationship
between genetic distance and interstate warfare. They argued that if genetic relatedness proxies for unobserved
similarity in preferences over rival and excludable goods, then conflict over the control of such resources would
be more likely to arise between nations that are genetically closer to one another.
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an ethnic group (Eifert, Miguel, and Posner (2010), Caselli and Coleman (2013), Besley
and Reynal-Querol (2014)).
The present study also contributes to a vast literature that explores the impact of ethno-
linguistic fragmentation and interethnic economic inequality on other societal outcomes,
including the rate of economic growth, the quality of national institutions, the extent of fi-
nancial development, the efficiency in the provision of public goods, and the level of social
capital (Easterly and Levine (1997), Alesina and La Ferrara (2005), Alesina, Michalopou-
los, and Papaioannou (2016)). In particular, since population diversity encompasses the
degree of heterogeneity within each ethnic group as well as the pairwise distances amongst
them, the current analysis is uniquely positioned to capture the contribution of these ad-
ditional dimensions of diversity to social dissonance and aggregate inefficiency.
Furthermore, in light of the view that the contemporary variation in population diver-
sity across the globe predominantly reflects the human expansion out of Africa tens of
thousands of years ago, the paper contributes to the exploration of the role of deeply
rooted human characteristics in comparative economic development. In particular, the
study contributes to the understanding of the importance of interpersonal population
diversity for social outcomes in the course of human history (e.g., population density,
urbanization, and income) as explored by Ashraf and Galor (2013a).5
Finally, the study is consistent with the primordialist theories of conflict, maintaining
that ethnic conflict springs from differences in ethnic identity, as well as with the instru-
mentalist theories, suggesting that ethnic conflict may emerge for pragmatic reasons (e.g.,
inequality, security, and competition).6 In particular, since the initial endowment of inter-
personal population diversity at a given location may have facilitated the endogenous
formation of groups, whose collective identities diverged over time under the forces of
cultural drift, a reduced-form link between the prehistorically determined diversity and
the contemporary risk of interethnic conflict may well be apparent in the data, regard-
less of whether these groups are mobilized into conflict by primordial or instrumentalist
reasons.
3. POPULATION DIVERSITY AND CONFLICT AT THE COUNTRY LEVEL
3.1. Empirical Framework and Strategy
This section describes the various layers of the country-level analyses of the influence of
population diversity on intrastate conflicts, the key variables employed, and the strategies
implemented to identify the impact of population diversity on conflict.7
The analysis initially focuses on contemporary conflicts, exploiting variations in either
cross-country or repeated cross-country data. It explores the explanatory power of in-
terpersonal population diversity for (i) the average frequency of new conflict outbreaks,
(ii) the persistence of conflicts, as captured by the likelihood of conflict prevalence, and
5The importance of prehistorically determined human characteristics was further explored by Spolaore and
Wacziarg (2013) and Ashraf and Galor (2013b, 2018).
6In addition, the modernist viewpoint (Bates (1983), Gellner (1983), Wimmer (2002)) stresses that intereth-
nic conflict arises from increased competition over scarce resources, especially when previously marginalized
groups that were excluded from the nation-building process experience socioeconomic modernization and,
thus, begin to challenge the status quo.
7Detailed definitions and data sources of all variables employed by the various analyses at the country level
are presented in Section A of the Data Supplement (posted with the replication data and programs).
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(iii) the likelihood of conflict outbreak. It then analyzes the impact of interpersonal diver-
sity on intragroup factional conflicts within a national population. Finally, it explores the
influence of interpersonal diversity on conflicts in the distant past.
Following the convention in the civil conflict literature, the contemporary analysis is
confined to the post-1960 time period, when most of the European colonies in Sub-
Saharan Africa, the Middle East, and South and Southeast Asia had already gained in-
dependence. This timeframe thus permits an assessment of the correlates of civil conflict
at the national level, independently of their interactions with the contemporaneous influ-
ence of the colonial powers. The baseline sample for the contemporary analysis contains
information on 150 countries for the 1960–2017 time period, of which 123 are in the Old
World.
3.1.1. Main Outcome Variables: Frequency, Incidence, and Onset of Civil Conflict
The main outcome variable in the cross-country regressions is the average number of
new civil conflicts per annum during the 1960–2017 time period. It is based on conflict
events listed in version 18.1 of the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch, Wal-
lensteen, Eriksson, Sollenberg, and Strand (2002), Pettersson and Eck (2018)). In this
data set, a civil conflict is defined as an armed conflict between the government of a state
and internal opposition groups over a given incompatibility. Recurrent episodes of the
same conflict between state actors and armed opposition groups are not treated as new
conflicts. The study employs the most comprehensive armed conflict coding (PRIO25),
encompassing all civil conflict events that resulted in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a
given year.
The country-level analysis additionally exploits the temporal dimension of armed con-
flict events, examining the incidence of PRIO25 civil conflicts in a repeated cross-section
of countries. In this analysis, the outcome variable is an indicator, coded 1 for each
country-period (a period being a 5-year time interval) in which at least one active PRIO25
civil conflict is observed, and 0 otherwise. The study also examines the predictive power of
population diversity for the onset of new PRIO25 civil conflicts in annually repeated cross-
country data. This variable is coded 1 for each year in which at least one new PRIO25 civil
conflict had erupted, and 0 otherwise. Moreover, outbreaks of subsequent episodes of the
same conflict are not considered new conflict onsets.
3.1.2. Population Diversity: Measurement and Identification Strategy
The interpersonal population diversity of each country is captured by the measure of
predicted genetic diversity developed by Ashraf and Galor (2013a). It is based on (i) the
proportional representation of each of the ancestral populations of a contemporary na-
tion, (ii) the genetic diversity of each of these ancestral populations, as predicted by its
migratory distance from Africa, and (iii) the pairwise genetic distances between each pair
of these ancestral populations, as predicted by their migratory distances from one an-
other.
Observed genetic diversity at the ethnic-group level is measured by an index referred
to by population geneticists as expected heterozygosity. This index reflects the probability
that two individuals, selected at random from the relevant population, are different from
one another with respect to a given spectrum of genetic traits. The index is constructed by
population geneticists using data on allelic frequencies (i.e., the frequency with which a
gene variant or allele occurs in a given population).8 Expected heterozygosity, Hexp, takes
8See Ashraf and Galor (2018).
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the form
Hexp = 1 − 1
m
m∑
l=1
kl∑
i=1
p2i ,
where m is the number of genes or DNA loci in the sample, kl is observed variants or
alleles of gene l, and pi denotes the frequency of occurrence of the ith allele.
Population geneticists have computed this index of expected heterozygosity, along with
pairwise genetic distances, for a sample of 53 globally representative ethnic groups from
the Human Genome Diversity Cell Line Panel.9 These ethnic groups have been not only
prehistorically native to their current geographical locations but also largely isolated from
genetic flows from other ethnic groups. The index is constructed using data on allelic fre-
quencies for a particular class of DNA loci called microsatellites, residing in non-protein-
coding or “neutral” regions of the human genome—that is, regions that do not directly
result in phenotypic expression. Thus, this measure of observed genetic diversity has the
advantage of not being tainted by the differential forces of natural selection that may have
operated on these populations since their prehistoric exodus from Africa.
Nevertheless, like measures of ethnolinguistic fragmentation based on fractionalization
or polarization indices, observed genetic diversity might be endogenous to civil conflict,
since it could be tainted by genetic admixtures resulting from the movement of popula-
tions across space, triggered by cross-regional differences in patterns of historical conflict
potential, the nature of political institutions, and levels of economic prosperity. To cir-
cumvent this concern, the analysis is based on the measure of predicted genetic diversity
introduced by Ashraf and Galor (2013a). Exploiting the explanatory power of a serial
founder effect associated with the “out of Africa” migration process, the diversity of a
country’s prehistorically indigenous population is predicted by the coefficients obtained
from an ethnic-group-level regression of expected heterozygosity on migratory distance
from Addis Ababa in the aforementioned sample comprising 53 globally representative
ethnic groups from the Human Genome Diversity Cell Line Panel. This measure cap-
tures the component of observed interpersonal diversity within a country’s indigenous
ethnic groups that is predicted by migratory distance from Addis Ababa to the country’s
modern-day capital city, along prehistoric land-connected human migration routes.10
In the absence of systematic and large-scale population movements across geograph-
ically (and, thus, genetically) distant regions, as had been largely true during the pre-
colonial era, the interpersonal diversity of the prehistorically native population in a given
location serves as a good proxy for the contemporary population diversity of that location.
While this continues to remain true to a large extent for nations in the Old World (i.e.,
Africa, Europe, and Asia), post-1500 population flows from the Old World to the New
World have had a considerable impact on the ethnic composition and, thus, the contem-
porary interpersonal diversity of national populations in the Americas and Oceania. Thus,
9The Human Genome Diversity Cell Line is compiled by the Human Genome Diversity Project (HGDP) in
collaboration with the Centre d’Etudes du Polymorphisme Humain (CEPH).
10Consistent with the serial founder effects associated with the prehistoric “out of Africa” migration pro-
cess, expected heterozygosity in microsatellites declines with migratory distance from East Africa across ethnic
groups. Mounting evidence from the fields of physical and cognitive anthropology, surveyed in Ashraf and Ga-
lor (2018), additionally reflect the influence of serial founder effects on various forms of intragroup phenotypic
and cognitive diversity, including phonemic diversity and interpersonal diversity in skeletal features pertaining
to cranial characteristics, dental attributes, and pelvic traits. Thus, the association of heterozygosity in neu-
tral genetic markers with socioeconomic outcomes may plausibly reflect the influence of diversity in various
observed and unobserved phenotypic characteristics.
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instead of employing the interpersonal diversity of prehistorically native populations (i.e.,
precolonial diversity) at the expense of limiting the analysis to the Old World, the mea-
sure of ancestry-adjusted genetic diversity from Ashraf and Galor (2013a) is employed
as the main proxy for contemporary population diversity. Using the shares of different
groups in a country’s modern-day population, this measure accounts for (i) the diversity
within the ethnic groups that can trace own ancestry around year 1500 to their current
homelands, (ii) the diversity of those descended from immigrant settlers over the past
half-millennium, and (iii) the additional component of population diversity at the national
level that arises from the pairwise genetic distances amongst these different subnational
groups.11
However, ancestry-adjusted population diversity may still be afflicted by endogeneity
bias because it accounts for the impact of cross-country migrations in the post-1500 era
on the diversity of contemporary national populations. In particular, these migrations may
have been spurred by historically persistent spatial patterns of conflict. Two alternative
strategies are implemented to address this issue. The first strategy is to exploit variations
across countries that only belong to the Old World, where, as discussed previously, the
interpersonal diversity of contemporary national populations overwhelmingly reflects the
diversity within populations that have been native to their current locations since well
before the colonial era. This strategy is based on the view that the great human migrations
of the post-1500 era had systematically differential impacts on the genetic composition of
national populations in the Old World versus the New World. Specifically, although post-
1500 population flows had a dramatic effect on the interpersonal diversity of national
populations in the Americas and Oceania, the diversity of populations in Africa, Europe,
and Asia remained largely unaltered, primarily because native populations in the Old
World were not subjected to substantial inflows of migrants that were descended from
genetically distant ancestral populations. By confining the analysis to the Old World, this
strategy effectively exploits the spatial variation in contemporary population diversity that
largely coincides with the variation in diversity of prehistorically indigenous populations,
as determined overwhelmingly by an ancient serial founder effect associated with the “out
of Africa” migration process.
The second strategy employs the migratory distance of the prehistorically native popu-
lations in each country from East Africa as an instrument for the country’s contemporary
population diversity. This strategy utilizes the observation that the mark of ancient pop-
ulation bottlenecks that occurred during the prehistoric “out of Africa” demic diffusion
of humans across the globe continues to be seen in the worldwide pattern of genetic di-
versity across contemporary national populations, as reflected by the sizable correlation
of 0.75 between the proxies for precolonial and contemporary population diversity in a
global sample of countries. This strategy rests on the identifying assumption that the mi-
gratory distance of a country’s prehistorically indigenous population from East Africa has
no direct effect on the potential for civil conflict faced by its modern national population,
conditional on a large set of controls for the geographical and institutional determinants
of conflict as well as the correlates of economic development.
11The data on the population shares of these different subnational groups at the country level are obtained
from the World Migration Matrix, 1500–2000 of Putterman and Weil (2010), who compiled, for each country in
their data set, the share of the country’s population in 2000 that is descended from the population of every other
country in 1500. For an in-depth discussion of the methodology underlying the construction of the ancestry-
adjusted measure of genetic diversity, the reader is referred to the data appendix of Ashraf and Galor (2013a).
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3.1.3. Confounding Characteristics
The vast empirical literature on civil conflict has considered a large number of con-
tributing factors. Drawing on this literature, a wide range of control variables are included
in the baseline specifications. The discussion below describes these potential confounders.
Additional control variables used in robustness checks are discussed in corresponding Ap-
pendices.
Geographical Characteristics. The study accounts for a wide range of geographical at-
tributes that may be correlated with prehistoric migratory distance from East Africa and
can influence conflict risk through channels unrelated to population diversity. Absolute
latitude and distance to the nearest waterway, for instance, can exert an influence on eco-
nomic development and, thus, on conflict potential through climatological, institutional,
and trade-related mechanisms.
Rugged terrains can provide safe havens for rebels and enable them to sustain contin-
ued resistance by protecting them from superior government forces (Fearon and Laitin
(2003)). Moreover, in regions with rough terrains, subgroups of a regional population may
be geographically more isolated. Such isolation may strengthen the forces of “cultural
drift” and ethnic differentiation among these groups (Michalopoulos (2012)), thus in-
creasing the potential for intergroup conflict. Further, in light of evidence that conditional
on their respective country-level means, greater intracountry dispersion in agricultural
land suitability and elevation can contribute to ethnolinguistic diversity (Michalopou-
los (2012)), these natural attributes could also generate an indirect influence on conflict
propensity through the ethnolinguistic fragmentation of the population.12 To account for
these factors, the baseline analysis controls for terrain ruggedness, as well as the mean
and range of both agricultural land suitability and elevation.
The baseline specifications also include an indicator variable for island nations. Due
to their greater isolation in space, island nations possibly followed different historical
trajectories than nations that are connected by land to one another. For example, the
settlement process that took place in island nations and their relative immunity from
cross-border spillovers may influence both population diversity and conflict potential. Fi-
nally, the baseline specifications additionally account for a complete set of continent fixed
effects to ensure that the estimated reduced-form impact of population diversity on con-
flict potential is not simply reflecting the latent influence of unobserved time-invariant
cultural, institutional, and geographical factors at the continent level.
Institutional Factors. Colonial legacies may have significantly shaped the political
economy of interethnic cleavages in newly independent states (Posner (2003)). More gen-
erally, the heritage of colonial rule and the identity of the former colonizers may have
important ramifications for the nature and stability of contemporary political institutions
at the national level, thereby influencing the potential for conflict in society. Two different
sets of covariates are included in the baseline specifications to account for the impact of
colonial legacies. Depending on the unit of analysis, the first set comprises either binary
indicators for the historical prevalence of colonial rule (as is the case in the cross-country
regressions) or time-varying measures of the lagged prevalence of colonial rule (as is the
case in the regressions using repeated cross-country data). In either case, a distinction is
12Although these measures of ethnolinguistic fragmentation are directly accounted for, their exogenous
geographical determinants may still explain some unobserved component of intrapopulation heterogeneity in
ethnic and cultural traits, thereby exerting some influence on the potential for conflict in society.
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made between colonial rule by the U.K., France, and any other major colonizing power.
The second set of covariates comprises time-invariant binary indicators for British and
French legal origins, included to account for any latent influence of legal codes and insti-
tutions that may not necessarily be captured by colonial experience.
The baseline specifications additionally include three control variables, all based on
yearly data at the country level from the Polity IV Project, in order to account for the
direct influence of contemporary political institutions on the risk of civil conflict. The first
variable is based on an ordinal index that reflects the degree of executive constraints in
any given year, whereas the other two variables are based on binary indicators for the type
of political regime, reflecting the prevalence of either democracy (when the polity score
is above 5) or autocracy (when the polity score is below −5) in a given year.13
Ethnolinguistic Fragmentation. Previous empirical findings regarding the role of ethnic
fragmentation in civil conflicts have been somewhat mixed, exhibiting substantial sensi-
tivity to model specifications and conflict codings (Fearon and Laitin (2003)). Moreover,
theoretical work on the link between the ethnic composition of a society and the risk of
civil conflict suggests that ethnic fractionalization by itself may be insufficient to fully cap-
ture the conflict potential that can be attributed to broader ethnolinguistic configurations
of the population (Esteban and Ray (2011)). In light of their well-grounded structural
foundations, indices of polarization have gained popularity as a substitute for—or in ad-
dition to—the fractionalization measures commonly considered by empirical analyses of
civil conflict. Indeed, many empirical studies find that ethnic polarization is a stronger
predictor of the likelihood of civil conflict (e.g., Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005), Es-
teban, Mayoral, and Ray (2012)).
Two time-invariant controls are thus included in the baseline specifications to capture
the influence of the ethnolinguistic composition of national populations on the poten-
tial for civil conflict. The first proxy is the well-known ethnic fractionalization index of
Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Easterly, Kurlat, and Wacziarg (2003), reflecting the probabil-
ity that two individuals, randomly selected from a country’s population, will belong to
different ethnic groups. The second proxy for this channel is an index of ethnolinguistic
polarization, obtained from the data set of Desmet, Ortuño-Ortín, and Wacziarg (2012).
The authors provided measures of several such polarization indices, constructed at differ-
ent levels of aggregation of linguistic groups in a country’s population (based on hierar-
chical linguistic trees). The specific polarization measure employed here corresponds to
the most disaggregated level of the linguistic tree and reflects the extent of polarization
across subnational groups classified according to modern-day languages.14
Natural Resources and Development Outcomes. Natural resources can foster the risk
of civil conflict by weakening political institutions and facilitating state capture, easing
the financial constraints on rebel organizations (e.g., Fearon and Laitin (2003), Dube and
Vargas (2013), Collier and Hoeffler (2007)), increasing the vulnerability of political elites
to terms-of-trade shocks (e.g., Humphreys (2005)), and raising the return to regional se-
cession (e.g., Ross (2006)). The baseline specifications thus include an indicator for the
presence of oil or gas reserves.
13The prevalence of anocracy, occurring when the polity score is between −5 and 5, therefore serves as the
omitted political regime category.
14The choice of Desmet, Ortuño-Ortín, and Wacziarg (2012) as the data source for ethnolinguistic polar-
ization is primarily due to the more comprehensive geographical coverage of their data set, relative to other
potential data sources such as Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) or Esteban, Mayoral, and Ray (2012).
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Average living standards can influence civil conflict potential in a country through sev-
eral channels. One argument, due to Grossman (1991) and Hirshleifer (1995), is that
higher per-capita incomes raise the opportunity cost for potential rebels to engage in in-
surrections, thus predicting an inverse relationship between the level or growth rate of
income, on the one hand, and the risk of civil conflict, on the other (Miguel, Satyanath,
and Sergenti (2004), Collier and Hoeffler (2007)). Another argument, due to Hirshleifer
(1991) and Grossman (1999), is that by raising the return to predation, higher per-capita
incomes can contribute to the risk of rapacious activities over society’s resources, con-
sistently with empirical findings from some of the aforementioned studies on the link
between income from natural resources and conflict potential. Furthermore, to the ex-
tent that income per capita serves as a proxy for state capabilities (Fearon and Laitin
(2003)), a higher level of per-capita income can reflect the notion of a state that is better
able to prevent or defend itself against rebel insurgencies, an idea that has also found
some recent empirical support (e.g., Bazzi and Blattman (2014)). Therefore, the base-
line specifications control for GDP per capita, as reported by the World Bank’s World
Development Indicators (WDI). Importantly, because population diversity, as proxied by
genetic diversity, has been shown to confer a hump-shaped influence on productivity at
the country level (Ashraf and Galor (2013a)), the inclusion of GDP per capita accounts
for the indirect effect of population diversity on conflict potential via the income channel.
Like income per capita, population size is also a standard covariate in empirical models
of conflict. One reason is that operational definitions of civil conflict typically impose a
death threshold, and violence-related casualties may be mechanically related to the size
of population. In addition, a larger population may imply a greater recruitment pool for
rebels (Fearon and Laitin (2003)). Further, to the extent that more populous countries
exhibit greater intrapopulation heterogeneity, they could also harbor stronger motives
for secessionist conflicts (Alesina and Spolaore (2003), Desmet, Breton, Ortuño-Ortín,
and Weber (2011)). The baseline specifications thus include controls for population size.
It should be noted that many of the aforementioned controls for institutional quality,
ethnolinguistic fragmentation, and the correlates of economic development are endoge-
nous in an empirical model of civil conflict, and as such, their estimated coefficients in
the regressions do not permit a causal interpretation. Nonetheless, controlling for these
factors may help with minimizing specification errors and assessing the extent to which
the reduced-form influence of population diversity on conflict potential can be attributed
to more conventional explanations in the literature.
3.2. Empirical Results
This section presents the main findings from several country-level analyses, establish-
ing a highly significant and robust reduced-form causal influence of population diver-
sity on various intrastate conflict outcomes over the past half-century. The exposition
commences with the results of the baseline cross-country regressions that explain the
annual frequency of civil conflict outbreaks in the post-1960 time period. It then dis-
cusses the results from conflict incidence and onset regressions that exploit variations
in repeated cross-country data, before presenting evidence that population diversity has
also been a significant predictor of contemporary intragroup conflict outcomes. The sec-
tion concludes with an analysis of conflicts during the 1400–1799 period, showing that
population diversity has had a deep influence on the conflict potential of societies over
many centuries. The analysis of each conflict outcome includes several robustness checks.
Some of these are collected and discussed in Appendix A.2 while others are relegated
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to Sections SA.1–SA.2 of the Supplemental Material (Arbath, Ashraf, Galor, and Klemp
(2020)).
3.2.1. Analysis of Civil Conflict Frequency in Cross-Country Data
The cross-country regressions attempt to explain the variation across countries in the
annual frequency of new civil conflict onsets—that is, the average number of new PRIO25
civil conflict eruptions per year—during the 1960–2017 time period. Specifically, the base-
line empirical model for the cross-country analysis is as follows:
CFi = β0 +β1̂DIV i +β′2GEOi +β′3ETHi +β′4INSi +β′5DEV i + εi (1)
where CFi is the (log-transformed) average number of new PRIO25 civil conflict out-
breaks per year in country i;̂DIV i is the ancestry-adjusted population diversity of the
national population; GEOi, ETHi, INSi, and DEV i are the respective vectors of control
variables for geographical characteristics (including continent dummies), ethnolinguis-
tic fragmentation, institutional factors, and the correlates of economic development, as
described in Section 3.1; and finally, εi is a country-specific disturbance term. All time-
varying controls for institutional factors and development outcomes enter the model as
their respective temporal means over the 1960–2017 timeframe.15
Table I presents the results from the baseline cross-country analysis. The analysis be-
gins with a bivariate regression in Column 1, showing that population diversity is indeed
a positive and highly significant correlate of the annual frequency of new civil conflict
eruptions. Specifically, the estimated coefficient suggests that a move from the 10th to the
90th percentile of the cross-country distribution of population diversity is associated with
an increase in conflict frequency by 0.014 new civil conflict outbreaks per year, a relation-
ship that is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. Bearing in mind that the sample
mean of the dependent variable is 0.022 outbreaks per year, this association is also of siz-
able economic significance, reflecting 44 percent of a standard deviation across countries
in the temporal frequency of new civil conflict onsets. Next, beginning with Column 2,
the analysis progressively includes an expanding set of covariates to the specification. It
first incorporates exogenous geographical characteristics and then additionally accounts
for measures of ethnolinguistic fragmentation, before controlling for semi-endogenous
institutional factors and more endogenous outcomes of economic development in the full
empirical model in Column 8.
Upon accounting for the potentially confounding influence of geographical character-
istics in Column 2, population diversity continues to remain statistically significant at the
1 percent level, but now, its coefficient is more than twice as large as the unconditioned
estimate from Column 1. This increase appears to be largely driven by the inclusion of
absolute latitude and the range of elevation and of land suitability as covariates to the
model, as all three variables enter the regression significantly and with expected signs.16
Based on the specification in Column 2, the scatter plots in Figure 2 depict the positive
and statistically significant cross-country relationship between population diversity and
15The summary statistics of all the variables exploited by the cross-country analysis of civil conflict frequency
are presented in Section A of the Data Supplement (posted with the replication data and programs).
16Specifically, countries located farther from the equator have seen fewer conflict outbreaks on average,
while those with greater dispersion in their respective land endowments have experienced such outbreaks
more frequently, a result that plausibly reflects the conflict-promoting role of ethnolinguistic fragmentation,
following the rationale provided by the findings of Michalopoulos (2012).
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the annual frequency of new civil conflict onsets, both in the full sample of countries and
in a sample that omits apparently influential outliers.
As revealed by the regression in Column 3, the point estimate of the impact of popu-
lation diversity on conflict becomes somewhat diminished once the specification is con-
ditioned to only exploit intracontinental cross-country variations. However, even after
including a complete set of continent dummies, the coefficient of interest remains statis-
tically significant at the 1 percent level and larger than the unconditioned estimate from
Column 1. It suggests that a move from the 10th to the 90th percentile of the cross-country
distribution of population diversity is associated with an increase in conflict frequency by
0.020 civil conflict outbreaks per year, corresponding to 65 percent of a standard deviation
of the cross-country conflict frequency distribution.
The regressions in Columns 4–6 indicate that when additionally subjected to controls
for ethnic fractionalization and ethnolinguistic polarization, either individually or jointly,
the point estimate of the coefficient on population diversity continues to remain largely
stable in both magnitude and statistical precision.17 In contrast, neither ethnic fraction-
alization nor ethnolinguistic polarization appears to possess any significant explanatory
power for the cross-country variation in the temporal frequency of civil conflict outbreaks,
conditional on population diversity and the baseline set of geographical covariates.18
The analysis in Column 7 replicates the specification from Column 6 except that it de-
composes the measure of overall interpersonal diversity of the national population into its
two components and jointly examines their conditional associations with conflict. The two
components of overall diversity capture the average interpersonal diversity within versus
between groups in the contemporary national population, where the subnational groups
are categorized by their ancestral origins prior to the great intercontinental migrations
of the post-1500 era.19 The results indicate that the within-group component of popula-
tion diversity is economically and statistically more important for explaining civil conflict.
Specifically, a move from the 10th to the 90th percentile of the cross-country distribution
of within-group diversity is associated with an increase in conflict frequency by 0.037 civil
conflict outbreaks per year, a relationship that is statistically significant at the 1 percent
level. On the other hand, a similar move along the cross-country distribution of between-
group diversity is associated with a less pronounced increase of 0.023 new civil conflict
onsets per year. The estimated response in the latter case is also statistically less precise,
reflecting statistical significance only at the 10 percent level. The greater importance of
the within-group component of population diversity is additionally reflected by a corre-
sponding partial R2 statistic that is nearly three times as large as that associated with the
between-group component.
17By restricting both fractionalization and polarization measures to enter the regressions linearly, the cur-
rent approach follows Esteban, Mayoral, and Ray (2012). Nevertheless, a robustness check of the main finding
to employing alternative specifications that allow for both a linear and a quadratic term in ethnic fractionaliza-
tion yielded qualitatively similar results (not reported).
18The analysis in Table SA.VIII in Section SA.1 of the Supplemental Material shows that although the two
measures of ethnolinguistic fragmentation do independently possess some explanatory power for the temporal
frequency of conflict onsets after accounting for geographical confounders, these conditional relationships are
not statistically robust to the inclusion of continent dummies to the specifications.
19Thus, for a given contemporary national population, the within-group component of overall diversity re-
flects the weighted average group-level interpersonal diversity, using the population shares of these subnational
groups as weights, whereas the between-group component reflects the residual fraction of overall diversity that
is unexplained by the within-group component. The latter component therefore corresponds to an aggregate
measure of intergroup distances amongst all subnational groups in the national population.
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FIGURE 2.—Population diversity and the frequency of civil conflict onset across countries. Notes: This fig-
ure depicts the global cross-country relationship between contemporary population diversity and the annual
frequency of new PRIO25 civil conflict onsets during the 1960–2017 time period, conditional on the baseline
geographical correlates of conflict, as considered by the specification in Column 2 of Table I. The relationship
is depicted for either an unrestricted sample of countries (Panel (a)) or a sample that omits apparently influ-
ential outliers (Panel (b)). Each of the two panels presents an added-variable plot with a partial regression
line. Given that the unrestricted sample employed by the left panel is not constrained by the availability of
data on other covariates considered by the analysis in Table I, the regression coefficients reported in this panel
are marginally different from those presented in Column 2 of Table I. The set of influential outliers omitted
from the sample in Panel (b) includes Bosnia and Herzegovina (BIH), Ethiopia (ETH), Georgia (GEO), India
(IND), and Ukraine (UKR).
The full specification in Column 8 augments the intermediate specification from Col-
umn 6 with controls for colonial legacy and contemporary institutional factors, as well
as controls for the natural resource curse, population size, and GDP per capita. Reas-
suringly, regardless of the potential endogeneity of these additional covariates, the point
estimate of the coefficient on population diversity remains remarkably stable in both mag-
nitude and statistical significance in comparison to the estimates from previous columns.
In particular, the coefficient of interest from this regression suggests that conditional on
the complete set of controls for geographical characteristics, ethnolinguistic fragmenta-
tion, institutional factors, and outcomes of economic development, a move from the 10th
to the 90th percentile of the cross-country distribution of population diversity is associ-
ated with an increase in conflict frequency by 0.021 new PRIO25 civil conflict outbreaks
per year, or 68 percent of a standard deviation of the cross-country conflict frequency
distribution. Moreover, the adjusted R2 statistic of the regression suggests that the full
empirical model explains about 36 percent of the cross-country variation in conflict fre-
quency, whereas the partial R2 statistic associated with population diversity indicates that
5 percent of the residual cross-country variation in conflict frequency can be explained by
the residual cross-country variation in population diversity.
Addressing Endogeneity. The results thus far demonstrate a highly significant and ro-
bust cross-country association between population diversity and the temporal frequency
of civil conflict onsets over the last half-century, even after conditioning the analysis on
a sizable set of controls for geographical characteristics, ethnolinguistic fragmentation,
institutional factors, and development outcomes. Nevertheless, this association could be
marred by endogeneity bias, in light of the possibility that the large-scale human migra-
tions of the post-1500 era—as captured by the ancestry-adjusted measure of interpersonal
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diversity for contemporary national populations—and the spatial pattern of conflicts in
the modern era could be codetermined by common unobserved forces (e.g., the spatial
pattern of historical conflicts) that may not be fully accounted for by covariates. Although
the stability of the coefficient of interest across specifications suggests that selection on
unobservables needs to be unreasonably strong to fully explain away the main finding,
one cannot rely entirely on OLS point estimates to assess causality.20 Thus, as discussed
previously in Section 3.1, the analysis exploits two alternative identification strategies to
address this issue. The specifications in Columns 9–10 implement the first approach to
causal identification by simply restricting the OLS estimator to exploit variations in a
subsample of countries that only belong to the Old World. Then, in Columns 11–12, the
analysis conducts 2SLS regressions that employ the migratory distance of the prehistori-
cally native population in each country from East Africa as an instrument for the country’s
contemporary population diversity. The identifying assumption is that migratory distance
from East Africa is plausibly exogenous to the risk of civil conflict in the post-1960 time
period, conditional on the sizable vector of control variables.
As is evident from the regressions in Columns 9–12, the two alternative identifica-
tion strategies yield remarkably similar results, with the point estimate of the coefficient
on population diversity being noticeably larger in magnitude, relative to its less well-
identified counterpart in the global-sample OLS regressions (from either Column 3 or
Column 8). In particular, the coefficient is highly statistically significant across the four
better-identified specifications, and as estimated by the 2SLS regression in Column 12,
it suggests that a move from the 10th to the 90th percentile of the global cross-country
distribution of population diversity is associated with an increase in conflict frequency by
0.041 new PRIO25 civil conflict outbreaks per year, corresponding to 133 percent of a
standard deviation of the global cross-country conflict frequency distribution.
There are plausibly three distinct rationales—perhaps operating in tandem—for why
the better-identified point estimates of the coefficient on population diversity are larger
than their less well-identified counterparts. First, the spatial pattern of social conflict may
exhibit long-term persistence for reasons other than population diversity. If persistent
conflict spurred emigrations and atrocities that gradually led to systematically more ho-
mogeneous populations (Fletcher and Iyigun (2010)) in conflict-prone areas, there should
be a downward bias in the estimated coefficient on population diversity in an OLS regres-
sion that explains the global variation in civil conflict potential in the modern era.
A second plausible explanation is that the pattern of conflict risk in the modern era,
especially across populations in the New World that experienced a substantial increase
in diversity from migrations in the post-1500 era, has been influenced not so much by
the higher population diversity of the immigrants but more so by the unobserved (or
observed but noisily measured) human capital that European settlers brought with them,
the colonization strategies that they pursued, and the sociopolitical institutions that they
established. To the extent that these unobserved factors associated with European settlers
in the New World served, in one way or another, to reduce the risk of social conflict in
the modern national populations of the Americas and Oceania, they could also introduce
a negative bias in the OLS estimates of the relationship between population diversity and
conflict risk in a global sample of countries.
A third possible rationale is that in the end, population diversity explains the conflict
propensity of a population mostly through its prehistorically determined component. This
component may have contributed to the formation and ethnic differentiation of native
20For a more formal analysis of selection on observables and unobservables, see Appendix A.2.
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groups in a given location and, thus, to more deeply rooted interethnic divisions amongst
these groups. As such, conditional on continent fixed effects that absorb any systematic
differences in the pattern of post-1500 population flows into locations in the Old World
versus the New World, the ancestry-adjusted measure of interpersonal diversity—which
incorporates the diversity of both native and non-native groups in a contemporary na-
tional population—might be a noisy proxy for the “true” measure of prehistorically de-
termined population diversity. Therefore, as a result of this “measurement error,” the
influence of the ancestry-adjusted measure of population diversity might be attenuated in
an OLS regression that exploits worldwide variations.
Given that both of the identification strategies ultimately exploit the variation in popu-
lation diversity across populations that have been prehistorically indigenous to their cur-
rent locations, either by omitting the modern national populations of the New World
from the estimation sample or by instrumenting contemporary population diversity in a
globally representative sample of countries with the prehistoric migratory distance of a
country’s geographical location from East Africa, the better-identified estimates mitigate
all the aforementioned sources of negative bias.
Robustness Checks. The analysis in Appendix A.2 shows that population diversity pos-
sesses significant power for explaining the cross-country variation in the total count of
new conflict onsets during the 1960–2017 time period (Table A.II). It also establishes
the robustness of the baseline cross-country findings to accounting for (1) spatial depen-
dence across observations by estimating spatial regressions (Table A.III); (2) the prop-
erty of population diversity as a generated regressor by bootstrapping the standard errors
(Table A.IV); and (3) various ecological and climatic covariates, including the temporal
means and volatilities of annual temperature and precipitation over the relevant sample
period and time-invariant measures of ecological fractionalization and polarization (Ta-
ble A.V).
Further, Section SA.1 of the Supplemental Material presents several robustness checks
for the cross-country analysis of the influence of population diversity on the temporal fre-
quency of civil conflict outbreaks in the post-1960 time period. It demonstrates that the
main findings are qualitatively robust to accounting for (1) the timing of the Neolithic
Revolution, state antiquity, the duration of human settlement, and distance from the
regional technological frontier in 1500 (Table SA.I); (2) inequality across ethnic home-
lands as well as overall spatial inequality in nighttime luminosity within a country (Ta-
ble SA.II); (3) linguistic rather than ethnic fractionalization as a baseline covariate (Ta-
ble SA.III); (4) alternative measures of ethnolinguistic fractionalization and polarization,
based on the spatial distribution of language homelands and on gridded population data
(Table SA.IV); (5) the initial-year values of time-varying baseline covariates rather than
their temporal means over the sample period (Table SA.V); (6) spatial autocorrelation in
unobserved heterogeneity (Table SA.VI); and (7) the elimination of world regions from
the estimation sample that could have been statistically influential for generating the key
empirical pattern (Table SA.VII).
3.2.2. Analysis of Civil Conflict Incidence in Repeated Cross-Country Data
The analysis now proceeds to examine the temporal prevalence of civil conflict. Specifi-
cally, exploiting the time structure of quinquennially repeated cross-country data, it inves-
tigates the predictive power of population diversity for the likelihood of observing the in-
cidence of one or more active conflict episodes in a given 5-year interval during the 1960–
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2017 time period. The following probit model is therefore estimated using maximum-
likelihood estimation:
CP∗it = γ0 + γ1̂DIV i + γ′2GEOi + γ′3INSit−1 + γ′4ETHi + γ′5DEV it−1
+ γ6Cit−1 + γ′7δt +ηit ≡ γ′Zit +ηit; (2)
Cit = 1
[
CP∗it ≥D∗
]; (3)
Pr(Cit = 1|Zit)= Pr
(
CP∗it ≥D∗|Zit
)=	(γ′Zit −D∗
)
 (4)
where CP∗it is a latent variable measuring the potential for an active conflict episode in
country i during any given 5-year interval, t, and it is modeled as a linear function of ex-
planatory variables. In particular, the time-invariant explanatory variableŝDIV i, GEOi,
and ETHi are all as previously defined, but now, the time-varying covariates included in
INSit−1 and DEV it−1 enter as their respective temporal means over the previous 5-year
interval. Further, δt is a vector of time-interval (5-year period) dummies, and ηit is a
country-period-specific disturbance term.21 By specifying each of the time-varying con-
trols to enter the model with a one-period lag, the analysis aims to mitigate the concern
that the use of contemporaneous measures of these covariates may exacerbate reverse-
causality bias in their estimated coefficients.22 Finally, the model assumes that contem-
porary conflict potential additionally depends on the lagged incidence of civil conflict,
Cit−1, which accounts for the possibility that countries with a conflict experience in the
immediate past may exhibit a higher conflict potential in the current period, mainly be-
cause of the intertemporal spillovers that are common to most conflict processes—for
example, the self-reinforcing nature of past casualties on either side of a conflict.23 Be-
cause the continuous variable reflecting conflict potential, CP∗it , is unobserved, its level
can only be inferred from the binary incidence variable, Cit , indicating whether the latent
conflict potential was sufficiently intense for the annual battle-related death threshold of
a civil conflict episode to have been surpassed during a given 5-year interval. As is evident
from equations (3)–(4), D∗ is the corresponding threshold for unobserved conflict poten-
tial, and it appears as an intercept in 	(·), the cumulative distribution function for the
disturbance term, ηit .
The main results for the temporal prevalence (or incidence) of PRIO25 civil conflict
episodes are presented in Columns 1–4 of Table II. In the interest of brevity, the analysis
exclusively reports the better-identified point estimates—namely, from probit regressions
21The robustness of the current analysis of conflict incidence to exploiting variations in annually (rather than
quinquennially) repeated cross-country data is confirmed in Appendix A.2. Naturally, in those regressions, the
time-dependent covariates enter as their lagged annual values (instead of their lagged 5-year temporal means)
and time fixed effects are captured by a set of year dummies.
22An alternative method to address the reverse-causality problem, in the context of quinquennially repeated
cross-country data, would have been to control for time-dependent covariates as measured in the initial year of
each 5-year interval. Although this method would retain the first-period observation for each country, which is
dropped under the current specification, it leaves open the possibility that the presence or absence of an active
conflict in the first year of each period may still exert a direct influence on the time-varying controls.
23In adopting this strategy, the current analysis of conflict incidence follows Esteban, Mayoral, and Ray
(2012). It may also be noted here that because the measure of population diversity is time-invariant (as is
the case with all known measures of ethnolinguistic fragmentation, based on fractionalization or polarization
indices), the analysis is unable to either account for country fixed effects or exploit dynamic panel estimation
methods, despite the time dimension of the repeated cross-country data. In all regressions exploiting such data,
however, the robust standard errors of the estimated coefficients are always clustered at the country level.
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TABLE II
POPULATION DIVERSITY AND THE INCIDENCE OR ONSET OF CIVIL CONFLICT IN REPEATED
CROSS-COUNTRY DATAa
Cross-country sample: Old World Global Old World Global
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Probit Probit IV Probit IV Probit Probit Probit IV Probit IV Probit
Quinquennial PRIO25 civil conflict
incidence, 1960–2017
Annual PRIO25 civil conflict
onset, 1960–2017
Population diversity
(ancestry adjusted)
134 122 143 136 617 636 707 880
(370) (379) (365) (421) (258) (264) (259) (317)
Ethnic fractionalization −040 −052 −0084 −032
(035) (033) (025) (028)
Ethnolinguistic polarization 0049 032 017 033
(034) (034) (025) (025)
Continent dummies × × × × × × × ×
Time dummies × × × × × × × ×
Controls for temporal spillovers × × × × × × × ×
Controls for geography × × × × × × × ×
Controls for institutions × × × ×
Controls for oil, population,
and income
× × × ×
Observations 1270 1045 1583 1311 5452 4377 6996 5757
Countries 123 121 150 147 123 121 150 147
Pseudo R2 042 044 013 016
Marginal effect of diversity 255 226 282 260 032 033 034 042
(068) (071) (074) (085) (014) (014) (013) (017)
FIRST STAGE Population diversity
(ancestry adjusted)
Population diversity
(ancestry adjusted)
Migratory distance from East Africa
(in 10,000 km)
−0068 −0066 −0068 −0066
(00056) (00065) (00055) (00064)
First-stage F-statistic 1454 999 1515 1026
aThis table exploits variations in repeated cross-country data to establish a significant positive reduced-form impact of contempo-
rary population diversity on the likelihood of observing (i) the incidence of a PRIO25 civil conflict in any given 5-year interval during
the 1960–2017 time period (Columns 1–4); and (ii) the onset of a new PRIO25 civil conflict in any given year during the 1960–2017 time
period (Columns 5–8), conditional on ethnic diversity measures as well as the proximate geographical, institutional, and development-
related correlates of conflict. The controls for geography include absolute latitude, ruggedness, distance to the nearest waterway, the
mean and range of agricultural suitability, the mean and range of elevation, and an indicator for small island nations. The controls
for institutions include a set of legal origin dummies, comprising two indicators for British and French legal origins, as well as six
time-dependent covariates, comprising the degree of executive constraints, two indicators for the type of political regime (democracy
and autocracy), and three indicators for experience as a colony of the U.K., France, and any other major colonizing power. The control
for oil presence is a time-invariant indicator for the discovery of a petroleum (oil or gas) reserve by the year 2003. The controls for
population and income are the time-dependent log-transformed values of total population and GDP per capita. In Columns 1–4, all
time-dependent covariates assume their average annual values over the previous 5-year interval, whereas in Columns 5–8, they assume
their annual values from the previous year. To account for duration dependence and temporal spillovers in conflict outcomes, all re-
gressions control for the lagged incidence of conflict, and the regressions in Columns 5–8 additionally control for a set of cubic splines
of the number of peace years. For regressions based on the global sample, the set of continent dummies includes five indicators for
Africa, Asia, North America, South America, and Oceania, whereas for regressions based on the Old World sample, the set includes
two indicators for Africa and Asia. The IV probit regressions exploit prehistoric migratory distance from East Africa to the indigenous
(precolonial) population of a country as an excluded instrument for the country’s contemporary population diversity. The estimated
marginal effect of a 1 percentage point increase in population diversity is the average marginal effect across the entire cross-section of
observed diversity values, and it reflects the increase in either the quinquennial likelihood of a conflict incidence (Columns 1–4) or the
annual likelihood of a conflict onset (Columns 5–8), both expressed in percentage points. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors,
clustered at the country level, are reported in parentheses.
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in a sample of countries belonging only to the Old World, and from IV probit regres-
sions that exploit migratory distance from East Africa as an instrument for contemporary
population diversity in a global sample of countries. For each of these two identification
strategies, two distinct specifications are estimated: one that partials out the influence of
only exogenous geographical covariates (including continent fixed effects), and another
that conditions the analysis on the full set of control variables from the empirical model
of conflict incidence.
As is evident from the results, interpersonal population diversity enters all four spec-
ifications with a positive and highly significant coefficient. To interpret the coefficient of
interest, the IV probit regression presented in Column 4 suggests that conditional on the
complete set of control variables, a 1 percentage point increase in population diversity
leads to an increase in the quinquennial likelihood of a PRIO25 civil conflict incidence
by 2.6 percentage points. Indeed, this sample-wide average marginal effect of population
diversity is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. In addition, the economic signif-
icance of population diversity for conflict incidence is evident in the plots presented in
Figure SA.1 in Section SA.3 of the Supplemental Material. Based on the regressions in
Columns 2 and 4, these plots illustrate how the predicted quinquennial likelihood of a civil
conflict incidence varies as one moves along the cross-country distribution of population
diversity in the relevant estimation sample. Specifically, a move from the 10th to the 90th
percentile of the cross-country distribution of population diversity leads to an increase in
the predicted quinquennial likelihood of civil conflict incidence from about 23 to 33 per-
cent amongst countries in the Old World, and from about 18 to 34 percent in the global
sample of countries.
Robustness Checks. The analysis in Appendix A.2 shows that the influence of popu-
lation diversity on the incidence or prevalence of conflict is robust to (1) accounting for
time-invariant fractionalization and polarization indices of ecological diversity as well as
time-varying climatic covariates, including the inter-annual means and volatilities of tem-
perature and precipitation over the previous 5-year interval (Table A.VI, Columns 1–4);
(2) considering alternative definitions and types of intrastate conflict as the outcome vari-
able, such as the prevalence of large-scale civil conflicts (i.e., “civil wars”) and of intrastate
conflicts involving only non-state actors (Table A.VII); (3) exploiting variations in annu-
ally rather than quinquennially repeated cross-country data (Table A.VIII, Columns 1–4);
and (4) considering an alternative coding of conflict prevalence that captures the share of
years with an active civil conflict in a given 5-year interval (Table A.VIII, Columns 5–8).
Further, Section SA.2 of the Supplemental Material demonstrates that the main find-
ings for the impact of population diversity on civil conflict incidence are qualitatively
insensitive to accounting for (1) various deep-rooted correlates of long-run economic
development, such as the depth of state antiquity, the time elapsed since the Neolithic
Revolution, the duration of human settlement, and distance to the year-1500 technolog-
ical frontier (Table SA.IX, Columns 1–4); (2) inequality in nighttime luminosity across
gridded space and across ethnic homelands within a country (Table SA.X, Columns 1–4);
(3) alternative distributional indices of intergroup diversity (Alesina et al. (2003), Fearon
(2003), Esteban, Mayoral, and Ray (2012)) and for additional time-invariant geograph-
ical and historical correlates of conflict incidence potential, including the percentage of
mountainous terrain, the presence of noncontiguous subnational territories, and the in-
tensity of the disease environment (Table SA.XI); (4) the empirical modeling of conflict
prevalence using either classical logit or “rare events” logit (King and Zeng (2001)) esti-
mators, in lieu of the standard probit estimator (Table SA.XII, Columns 1–4); and (5) spa-
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tiotemporal dependence across country-time observations by exploiting two-dimensional
clustering of standard errors (Table SA.XIII, Columns 1–4).
Finally, akin to the current analysis of conflict prevalence, the analysis in Appendix A.1
exploits variations in quinquennially repeated cross-country data to establish interper-
sonal population diversity as a significant predictor of the intensity of social conflicts. In
particular, it examines both ordinal and continuous measures that capture the “severity”
of intrastate conflicts and of events related to general social unrest, including but not
limited to armed conflict.
3.2.3. Analysis of Civil Conflict Onset in Repeated Cross-Country Data
This section examines the onset of civil conflict. Unlike the model of conflict incidence,
the onset model focuses solely on explaining the outbreak of conflict events, classifying
the subsequent years into which a given conflict persists as nonevent years (akin to civil
peace), unless they coincide with the eruption of a “new” conflict.24 Conceptually, this
analysis assesses the extent to which population diversity at the national level influences
sociopolitical instability by triggering conflicts, rather than contributing to their perpetu-
ation over time. The probit model for the analysis of conflict onset is similar to the one
for conflict incidence, as described by equations (2)–(4), but with two notable exceptions.
Specifically, following the convention in the literature, the model (i) exploits variations in
annually repeated cross-country data, with the binary outcome variable assuming a value
of 1 if a country-year observation coincides with the first year of a new civil conflict, and
0 otherwise; and (ii) controls for a set of cubic splines in the number of preceding years
of uninterrupted peace, along with year dummies, in order to account for temporal or
duration dependence (Beck, Katz, and Tucker (1998)). To mitigate issues of causal identi-
fication of the influence of population diversity on conflict onset, the analysis implements
the same two strategies followed by the preceding analyses of conflict frequency and con-
flict incidence.
The main results for the onset of new PRIO25 civil conflicts are presented in
Columns 5–8 of Table II. Irrespective of the identification strategy employed, or the set
of covariates considered by the specification, population diversity appears to confer a
statistically significant and robust positive influence on the annual likelihood of new civil
conflict outbreaks. To elucidate the economic significance of this impact in the global sam-
ple of countries, the sample-wide average marginal effect estimated by the specification in
Column 8 suggests that conditional on the complete set of control variables, a 1 percent-
age point increase in population diversity leads to an increase in the annual likelihood
of a new PRIO25 civil conflict outbreak by 0.4 percentage points. Further, based on the
regressions in Columns 6 and 8, the plots presented in Figure SA.2 in Section SA.3 of the
Supplemental Material depict how the predicted annual likelihood of a new conflict onset
responds as one moves along the cross-country distribution of population diversity in the
relevant estimation sample. For instance, in response to a move from the 10th to the 90th
percentile of the cross-country distribution of population diversity, the predicted annual
likelihood of a new conflict onset rises from about 1.9 to 3.4 percent in the Old World
sample of countries, and from about 1.1 to 3.6 percent amongst countries worldwide.
Robustness Checks. The analysis in Appendix A.2 shows that the influence of popula-
tion diversity on the onset of conflict is robust to accounting for time-invariant fraction-
24A “new” civil conflict in a country is defined as one involving a previously unobserved set of actors and/or
a previously unobserved set of contentious issues.
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alization and polarization indices of ecological diversity as well as time-varying climatic
covariates, including the lagged annual values of temperature and precipitation and their
inter-annual volatilities over the previous 5 years (Table A.VI, Columns 5–8).
Moreover, Section SA.2 of the Supplemental Material demonstrates that the main find-
ings regarding the impact of population diversity on civil conflict onset remain quali-
tatively unaffected after accounting for (1) various deep-rooted correlates of long-run
economic development, such as the depth of state antiquity, the time elapsed since the
Neolithic Revolution, the duration of human settlement, and distance to the year-1500
technological frontier (Table SA.IX, Columns 5–8); (2) inequality in nighttime luminos-
ity across gridded space and across ethnic homelands within a country (Table SA.X,
Columns 5–8); (3) the empirical modeling of conflict onset using either classical logit or
“rare events” logit (King and Zeng (2001)) estimators, in lieu of the standard probit esti-
mator (Table SA.XII, Columns 5–8); (4) spatiotemporal dependence across country-year
observations by exploiting two-dimensional clustering of standard errors (Table SA.XIII,
Columns 5–8); (5) the influence of additional correlates of conflict onset potential, in-
cluding the time-invariant “ethnic dominance” indicator of Collier and Hoeffler (2004)
and the time-varying “political instability” and “new state” indicators of Fearon and
Laitin (2003) (Table SA.XIV); and (6) the contemporaneous and lagged values of an-
nual price shocks to various export commodities, as studied by Bazzi and Blattman (2014)
(Table SA.XV).
3.2.4. Analyses of Intragroup Conflict Incidence in Cross-Country and Repeated
Cross-Country Data
One crucial dimension in which the advanced measure of population diversity adds
value beyond standard indices of ethnolinguistic fragmentation is that it incorporates in-
formation on interpersonal heterogeneity not only across group boundaries but within
such boundaries as well. Thus, in contrast to standard measures of ethnolinguistic frag-
mentation at the national level, to the extent that interpersonal diversity can be expected
to give rise to social, political, and economic grievances that culminate to violent con-
tentions even within ethnically or linguistically homogeneous groups, the measure is nat-
urally better-suited to empirically link population diversity with intragroup conflicts in
society. The analysis in this section provides evidence that supports this important aspect
of the advanced measure, exploiting cross-country variations to establish a positive link
between population diversity and the incidence of intragroup conflict events during the
1985–2006 time period.
The primary source of the exploited data on the incidence of intragroup conflict events
across the globe is the All Minorities at Risk (AMAR) Phase 1 Sample Data (Birnir,
Laitin, Wilkenfeld, Waguespack, Hultquist, and Gurr (2018)). The AMAR Sample Data
is a single integrated data set, combining information on 291 subnational groups originally
included in the Minorities at Risk (MAR) project with information on 74 new groups ran-
domly selected from the AMAR Sample Frame of “socially relevant” subnational groups,
in order to correct for potential selection issues in the original MAR data (Phases I–V).
A “socially relevant” subnational group is defined as an ethnic group (majority or minor-
ity) that satisfies five criteria outlined and discussed in Birnir, Wilkenfeld, Fearon, Laitin,
Gurr, Brancati, Saideman, Pate, and Hultquist (2015).25 For each subnational group in
the AMAR Sample Data, the data set provides information on whether the group expe-
rienced one or more intragroup conflicts in each year during the 1985–2006 time period.
25These criteria are as follows: (1) Membership in the group is determined primarily by descent by both
members and non-members. (2) Membership in the group is recognized and viewed as important by members
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TABLE III
POPULATION DIVERSITY AND INTRAGROUP CONFLICTa
Cross-Country Sample: Old World Global
PANEL A
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Share of AMAR group-years with intragroup conflict, 1985–2006
Population diversity (ancestry adjusted) 446 427 358 573 561 512
(169) (171) (169) (176) (188) (189)
Continent dummies × × × × × ×
Controls for geography × × × × × ×
Controls for ethnic diversity × × × ×
Controls for institutions × × × ×
Controls for oil, population, and income × × × ×
Controls for number/share of AMAR groups × ×
Observations 91 91 91 115 115 115
Partial R2 of population diversity 0079 0068 0051
Adjusted R2 0092 019 023
Effect of 10th–90th percentile
move in diversity
022 021 018 039 038 035
(0083) (0084) (0083) (012) (013) (013)
FIRST STAGE Population diversity
(ancestry adjusted)
Migratory distance from East Africa
(in 10,000 km)
−0061 −0057 −0057
(00067) (00083) (00083)
First-stage F-statistic 834 479 471
(Continues)
Table III presents two distinct analyses of intragroup conflict incidence. The outcome
variable for the cross-country analysis (Panel A) is the share of group-years in a given
country with at least one active intragroup conflict over the sample period. For the anal-
ysis based on annually repeated cross-country data (Panel B), the outcome is a binary
variable that reflects whether any of the AMAR groups within a given country experi-
enced one or more intragroup conflicts in a given year. Depending on the identification
strategy from earlier sections (i.e., restricting the estimation sample to countries in the
Old World versus exploiting migratory distance from East Africa as an excluded instru-
ment for population diversity in a global sample of countries), the analysis employs either
OLS or 2SLS estimators in Panel A, and either probit or IV probit estimators in Panel B.
For each outcome variable, and for each of the two identification strategies, three alter-
native specifications are estimated. The first two of these follow from the methodology
in previous sections, in that one conditions the analysis on only exogenous geographical
covariates (including continent fixed effects), whereas the other partials out the influence
of the full set of controls for geographical characteristics, ethnolinguistic fragmentation,
institutional factors, and development outcomes. However, to account for the possibility
and/or non-members, where importance may be psychological, normative, and/or strategic. (3) Members share
some distinguishing cultural features, such as common language, religion, occupational niche, and customs
with respect to other groups in the country. (4) One or more of these cultural features are either practiced by
a majority of the group or preserved and studied by a set of members who are broadly respected by the wider
membership for so doing. (5) The group has at least 100,000 members or constitutes at least one percent of
the national population.
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TABLE III—Continued
Cross-Country Sample: Old World Global
PANEL B
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Probit Probit Probit IV Probit IV Probit IV Probit
Annual AMAR intragroup conflict incidence, 1985–2006
Population diversity (ancestry adjusted) 253 375 317 319 406 384
(934) (979) (105) (733) (726) (797)
Controls as in same column of Panel A × × × × × ×
Time dummies × × × × × ×
Observations 1658 1658 1658 2179 2179 2179
Countries 90 90 90 114 114 114
Pseudo R2 021 034 039
Marginal effect of diversity 738 911 707 872 103 940
(253) (230) (243) (199) (201) (221)
FIRST STAGE Population diversity
(ancestry adjusted)
Migratory distance from East Africa
(in 10,000 km)
−0061 −0060 −0060
(00070) (00073) (00073)
First-stage F-statistic 745 669 669
aThis table exploits variations across countries and years to establish a significant positive reduced-form impact of contemporary
population diversity on (i) the share of group-years of a country during the 1985–2006 time period in which an “all minorities at
risk” (AMAR) ethnic group of the country experienced an intragroup conflict (Panel A); and (ii) the likelihood of observing the
incidence of an intragroup conflict across a country’s AMAR ethnic groups in any given year during the 1985–2006 time period
(Panel B), conditional on ethnic diversity measures, the proximate geographical, institutional, and development-related correlates of
conflict, and measures capturing the number and total share of AMAR groups in the national population. The controls for geography
include absolute latitude, ruggedness, distance to the nearest waterway, the mean and range of agricultural suitability, the mean and
range of elevation, and an indicator for small island nations. The controls for ethnic diversity include ethnic fractionalization and
polarization. The controls for institutions include a set of legal origin dummies, comprising two indicators for British and French
legal origins, as well as six time-dependent covariates, comprising the degree of executive constraints, two indicators for the type of
political regime (democracy and autocracy), and three indicators for experience as a colony of the U.K., France, and any other major
colonizing power. The control for oil presence is a time-invariant indicator for the discovery of a petroleum (oil or gas) reserve by
the year 2003. The controls for population and income are the time-dependent log-transformed values of total population and GDP
per capita. In Panel A, all time-dependent covariates assume their average annual values over the entire 1985–2006 time period,
whereas in Panel B, they assume their annual values from the previous year. For regressions based on the global sample, the set of
continent dummies includes five indicators for Africa, Asia, North America, South America, and Oceania, whereas for regressions
based on the Old World sample, the set includes two indicators for Africa and Asia. The 2SLS and IV probit regressions exploit
prehistoric migratory distance from East Africa to the indigenous (precolonial) population of a country as an excluded instrument
for the country’s contemporary population diversity. In Panel A, the estimated effect associated with increasing population diversity
from the 10th to the 90th percentile of its cross-country distribution is expressed in terms of the share of group-years of a country in
which an intragroup conflict was experienced by an AMAR ethnic group. In Panel B, the estimated marginal effect of a 1 percentage
point increase in population diversity is the average marginal effect across the entire cross-section of observed diversity values, and it
reflects the percentage-point increase in the annual likelihood of an intragroup conflict incidence. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard
errors (clustered at the country level in Panel B) are reported in parentheses.
that the AMAR groups in a given country may not be fully representative of all its sub-
national groups, the third specification augments the full model with additional controls
for the total number and the total share of all AMAR groups in the national population.
Finally, in line with the methodology from earlier sections, all time-varying controls for in-
stitutional factors and development outcomes enter the specifications in Panel A as their
respective temporal means over the 1985–2006 time period, whereas in Panel B, these
covariates assume their respective lagged annual values.
The results in Table III indicate that regardless of the outcome variable examined, the
set of covariates considered, or the identification strategy employed, population diversity
has contributed substantially to the risk of intragroup conflicts during the 1985–2006 time
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period. This impact is not only highly statistically significant, but considerable in terms of
economic significance as well. For instance, the regression in Column 5 of Panel A sug-
gests that conditional on the full set of baseline controls, a move from the 10th to the
90th percentile of the global cross-country distribution of population diversity is associ-
ated with an increase of 38 percentage points in the likelihood that an AMAR group of a
country will have experienced an intragroup conflict at some point during the 1985–2006
time period. Moreover, as estimated by the regression in Column 5 of Panel B, a 1 per-
centage point increase in population diversity leads to an increase in the likelihood of
an intragroup conflict incidence in any given country-year during this timeframe by 10
percentage points. Based on the regressions in Columns 2 and 5 of Panel B, the plots
presented in Figure SA.3 in Section SA.3 of the Supplemental Material illustrate the pre-
dicted annual likelihood of an intragroup conflict incidence as a function of the percentile
of the cross-country distribution of population diversity in the relevant estimation sample.
Specifically, a move from the 10th to the 90th percentile of this distribution is predicted
to raise the annual likelihood of an intragroup conflict incidence from about 13 to 55 per-
cent amongst countries in the Old World, and from about 9 to 62 percent in the global
sample of countries.
3.2.5. Analysis of Historical Conflict Outcomes in Cross-Country Data
The analysis has thus far been confined to examining intrastate conflict events in the last
half-century. This restriction permitted it to focus on the post-independence time period
of the former European colonies, exploit better quality data and codings for intrastate
conflict events, and employ time-varying controls for institutional and development out-
comes, as is standard in civil conflict regressions. However, there is no a priori reason why
the conflict-promoting role of population diversity should not extend to the distant past.
This section investigates whether population diversity predicts historical conflict events
in a cross-section of countries. Specifically, the analysis exploits information on the loca-
tions of violent conflicts during the 1400–1799 time period, as compiled by Brecke (1999)
and geocoded by Dincecco, Fenske, and Onorato (2019), employing the geocoding of
conflict locations to map these historical conflicts to territories defined by contemporary
national borders. The examined time period excludes the colonial wars of the 19th and
early 20th centuries, many of which were associated with the Scramble for Africa. In par-
ticular, because these wars occurred as a consequence of local resistance to the European
colonizers or were triggered by the conflicting interests of the different colonial powers,
they are not expected to be related to local population diversity in a meaningful way.
The definition of a violent conflict in Brecke’s data set is based on Cioffi-Revilla (1996):
“An occurrence of purposive and lethal violence among 2+ social groups pursuing con-
flicting political goals that results in fatalities, with at least one belligerent group orga-
nized under the command of authoritative leadership. The state does not have to be an
actor. Data can include massacres of unarmed civilians or territorial conflicts between
warlords.” The list is composed of conflicts that resulted in at least 32 fatalities.26 Further,
although the data set does not systematically distinguish between intrastate and interstate
conflicts, the latter appear to form the basis of the recorded conflicts. Finally, while the
recorded conflicts do not necessarily represent the universe of conflict events during the
sample period, the list contains almost all major conflicts that have been documented by
historians.
26This fatality level corresponds to a magnitude of 1.5 or higher on the base-10 log conflict scale proposed
by Richardson (1960).
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In contrast to the analysis of modern conflicts, the explanatory variable of interest in
the current analysis is the precolonial population diversity (predicted by migratory dis-
tance from East Africa) of a territory bounded by its contemporary national borders. By
construction, this measure does not account for the impact of post-1500 migrations on
population diversity. In addition, it is not clear at the outset if one should expect any sys-
tematic relationship between the native population diversity of a given territory and the
outbreak of interstate—as opposed to internal—conflicts in that territory. However, given
that the measure of precolonial population diversity is collinear with migratory distance
from East Africa, if a conflict’s location is relatively close to the native territories of the
warring parties in the conflict, the measure should possess some explanatory power for
the onset of such conflicts. Because the conflicts examined occurred during a time pe-
riod when long-distance campaigns were uncommon, due to the constraints imposed by
historical transportation and warfare technologies, precolonial population diversity could
in principle explain a considerable part of the variation in interstate conflicts across the
globe, especially in earlier periods of the 1400–1799 timeframe.
Table IV presents the analysis of historical conflicts. For the specifications in Columns
1–5, the outcome variable captures the (log-transformed) total number of distinct conflict
events in different time intervals during the 1400–1799 time period.27 The specification
in Column 1 examines conflicts during the entire timeframe of four centuries, whereas
those in Columns 2–5 focus on the conflicts recorded for each individual century of the
timeframe. Indeed, the data on conflicts that occurred prior to the discovery of the New
World are expected to be less contaminated by information on interstate conflicts be-
tween warring parties whose combined population diversity is not representative of the
population diversity of the locations in which these conflicts occurred. The specifications
in Columns 6–10 replicate the analysis from Columns 1–5, except that the outcome vari-
able is an indicator for conflict onset that captures whether there was any recorded con-
flict event during the specified time interval. All specifications include the geographical
controls from the earlier analysis of modern conflicts. In addition, regional dummies are
included in all regressions to mitigate the concern that Brecke’s conflict data could suffer
from a regional bias in coverage, due to differences across world regions in the quality of
primary sources and in the nature and scale of historical conflict events.28
The results indicate that precolonial population diversity had a statistically significant
positive influence on both the number and the incidence of historical conflicts. This is true
for conflicts that occurred both in the century prior to the discovery of the New World and
in the centuries that followed. However, in line with the prior that the impact of native
population diversity on conflicts ought to dissipate in time periods marred by mostly in-
ternational or interregional conflicts (particularly, those involving ancestrally very distant
warring populations like the European colonial powers versus the natives), the association
between population diversity and conflicts is noticeably weaker in the centuries following
the advent of the colonial era.
The OLS estimate in Column 2 implies that a move from the 10th to the 90th per-
centile in the cross-country distribution of population diversity is associated with 8.4 more
conflicts during the 15th century. This impact is somewhat larger than those implied by
27The log transformation is applied to 1 plus the total number of conflicts in order to retain observations
without any recorded conflict.
28For example, primary sources on historical warfare in Sub-Saharan Africa are relatively scarce (Reid
(2014)), and unlike the large-scale campaigns common in European warfare, historical conflicts in Africa more
often took the form of raiding wars.
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the comparable specifications for modern civil conflicts.29 This could potentially reflect
a waning, albeit significant, influence of population diversity in more contemporary time
periods. However, it could also be a mechanical consequence of measurement issues as-
sociated with the fact that in contrast to the earlier analyses of modern civil conflicts, the
current analysis of historical conflicts does not distinguish between purely intrastate con-
flicts and interstate conflicts involving ancestrally proximate warring populations. As for
the economic significance of population diversity for historical conflict incidence, the pro-
bit regression in Column 7 implies that a move from the 10th to the 90th percentile in the
cross-country distribution of population diversity is associated with a 63 percent increase
in the likelihood of observing a conflict during the 15th century.
In sum, beyond providing temporal external validity to the main findings from the ear-
lier analyses of civil conflict in the contemporary era, the findings in this section attest to
a deep-rooted and persistent influence of population diversity on the risk of conflict in
society—an impact that is indeed apparent across many centuries.
4. POPULATION DIVERSITY AND CONFLICT AT THE ETHNICITY LEVEL
This section explores the contribution of interpersonal population diversity to the ex-
isting variation in the prevalence and severity of conflicts within ethnic homelands. The
focus on ethnic homelands permits the analysis to disentangle the impact of population
diversity within an ethnic group, rather than across groups, on conflict. Furthermore, the
ethnic-level analysis mitigates potential concerns about the confounding effects of popu-
lation diversity as well as conflict on national borders.
4.1. Data
The ethnic-level analysis is conducted using two novel geo-referenced data sets of eth-
nic homelands across the globe. The first data set consists of homelands of indigenous eth-
nic groups (largely isolated and shielded from genetic admixture) whose levels of diversity
are provided by the most comprehensive source on observed genetic diversity (Pember-
ton, DeGiorgio, and Rosenberg (2013)).30 The geo-referenced data set maps the genetic
diversity of individuals within each ethnic homeland, as reported in Pemberton, DeGior-
gio, and Rosenberg (2013), to the geographical characteristics of this homeland.31 The
data consist of 207 ethnic homelands for which genetic diversity is observed.32 The dis-
tribution of these ethnic groups across the globe is depicted in Figure 3. The level of
29For instance, in Column 3 of Table I, the estimated impact of the same move in the cross-country distribu-
tion of population diversity is 0.02 additional civil conflict outbreaks per year—that is, two additional conflicts
per century.
30Pemberton, DeGiorgio, and Rosenberg (2013) combined eight human genetic diversity data sets based
on the 645 loci that they share, including the HGDP-CEPH Human Genome Diversity Cell Line Panel used
by Ashraf and Galor (2013a). Since ethnic groups have been largely native to their ethnic homelands, at least
since the precolonial era, the measure of population diversity within the ethnic groups properly captures the
degree of population diversity within the ethnic homelands.
31Details regarding the construction of the data set are collected in Section B of the Data Supplement
(posted with the replication data and programs).
32The analysis includes all ethnic groups in Pemberton, DeGiorgio, and Rosenberg (2013) that can be
mapped into an ethnic homeland, excluding the Surui of South America. Population geneticists view the Surui
as an extreme outlier in terms of genetic diversity. In particular, Ramachandran et al. (2005) omitted the Su-
rui, as “an extreme outlier in a variety of previous analyses”. Including this observation, nevertheless, does not
affect the qualitative results.
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FIGURE 3.—The spatial distribution of ethnic homelands in the analysis. Notes: Each point represents the
centroid of the historical homeland of an ethnic group. Points depict homelands for which population diversity
is observed, whereas hollow circles depict homelands for which population diversity is predicted.
observed genetic diversity ranges from 0.55 among ethnic groups in South America to
0.77 among groups in Africa.
The second geo-referenced data set consists of all homelands of ethnic groups whose
geographical territories are delineated by the GREG (Geo-Referencing of Ethnic
Groups) repository, based on the Soviet Atlas Narodov Mira (Weidmann, Rød, and Ced-
erman (2010)). Population diversity within these ethnic homelands is predicted based on
prehistoric migratory distance from Addis Ababa, using the unconditional relationship
between observed genetic diversity and prehistoric migratory distance from Addis Ababa
derived from the 207-ethnic-homelands sample.
While the historical homeland of each ethnic group captures the area of the globe in
which the group is predominantly residing, the vast majority of ethnic homelands tend
to be fractionalized, as indicated by the fact that they are inhabited by multiple linguistic
groups. Hence, the analysis of the impact of interpersonal population diversity on conflict
accounts for the potentially confounding effects of the degree of linguistic fractionaliza-
tion and polarization within ethnic homelands on conflict.33
The main measure of conflict that is used in the ethnic-level analysis is derived from the
UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch et al. (2002)). In particular, the analysis
focuses on the average yearly share of the area of each ethnic homeland, over the period
1989–2008, that fell within the boundaries of internal armed conflict events (between the
government of a state and internal opposition groups).34 Furthermore, the analysis utilizes
a second set of measures that account for the number of conflict events, the number of
deaths, and the number of deaths per event, as recorded within each ethnic homeland in
the UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset (Sundberg, Eck, and Kreutz (2012), Croicu and
Sundberg (2015)).
33The measures of the degree of ethnolinguistic fractionalization and polarization in an ethnic homeland are
based on the proportional representation of each linguistic group within the ethnic homeland. The definitions
and data sources of variables employed by the ethnicity-level and other subnational analyses, along with the
summary statistics of the relevant samples, are presented in Section C of the Data Supplement (posted with
the replication data and programs).
34This measure is calculated using the gridded PRIO data (PRIO-GRID version 1.01) as reported by Tollef-
sen, Strand, and Buhaug (2012) based on the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset.
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FIGURE 4.—Migratory distance from East Africa and observed genetic diversity across ethnic homelands.
Notes: This figure depicts the relationship between prehistoric migratory distance from East Africa and ob-
served population diversity in a sample of 207 ethnic homelands. The negative relationship reflects the serial
founder effect associated with the diffusion of humans from East Africa to the rest of the world.
4.2. Empirical Strategy
The analysis implements several empirical strategies to mitigate concerns about the po-
tential role of reverse causality, omitted cultural, geographical, and human characteristics,
as well as sorting in the observed association between population diversity and civil con-
flicts within ethnic homelands. In particular, the positive associations between the extent
of the observed population diversity within an ethnic homeland and civil conflict may re-
flect reverse causality from conflict to population diversity. It is not inconceivable that in
the course of human history, conflicts within ethnic groups have operated towards homog-
enization of the population, reducing its observed levels of diversity. Hence, in order to
mitigate concerns about reverse causality, as well as concerns about sample limitations,
the ethnic-level analysis further exploits predicted population diversity, rather than ob-
served diversity, to explore the effect of diversity on civil conflict. In particular, as caused
by the serial founder effect (e.g., Harpending and Rogers (2000), Ramachandran et al.
(2005), Ashraf and Galor (2013a)) and depicted in Figure 4, observed population diver-
sity within geographically indigenous contemporary ethnic groups decreases with distance
along ancient migratory paths from East Africa. Hence, migratory distance from Africa is
exploited to predict population diversity for all ethnic groups in the GREG.
Furthermore, the associations between ethnic-level population diversity and civil con-
flicts may be governed by omitted cultural, geographical, and human characteristics. Thus,
in order to mitigate these concerns, the empirical analysis exploits two related strategies
that are similar to those employed by the preceding analysis at the country level. In light
of the serial founder effect, the analysis exploits the migratory distance from Africa to
each ethnic group as an instrumental variable for the observed level of population diver-
sity, and as a predictor for its level of diversity. Nevertheless, there are several plausible
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scenarios that would weaken this identification strategy. First, selective migration out of
Africa, or natural selection operating in different ways along the migratory paths, could
have affected human traits and therefore conflict independently of the effect of migratory
distance from Africa on the degree of diversity in human traits. Second, migratory dis-
tance from Africa could be correlated with distances from focal historical locations (e.g.,
technological frontiers) and could therefore capture the effect of these distances on the
process of development and the emergence of conflicts, rather than the effect of these
migratory distances via population diversity.
These potential concerns are mitigated, however, by the following observations. First,
while migratory distance from Africa has a significant negative association with the de-
gree of genetic diversity, it has no apparent association with the mean level of human
traits (Ashraf and Galor (2013a)), conditional on the distance from the equator. Second,
conditional on migratory distance from East Africa, migratory distances from historical
technological frontiers in the years 1, 1000, and 1500 do not affect the impact of pop-
ulation diversity on conflict, reinforcing the justification for the reliance on the “out of
Africa” hypothesis and the serial founder effect.
Moreover, an unlikely threat to the identification strategy would emerge if the actual
migration path out of Africa would have been correlated with geographical characteristics
that are directly conducive to conflicts (e.g., soil quality, ruggedness, climatic conditions,
and propensity to trade). This, however, would have implausibly involved that the con-
duciveness of these geographical characteristics to conflict would be aligned along the
main root of the migratory path out of Africa, as well as along each of the main forks
that emerge from this primary path. In particular, in several important forks in the course
of this migratory path (e.g., the Fertile Crescent and the associated eastward migration
towards East Asia and western migration towards Europe), the geographical character-
istics that are conducive to conflicts would have to diminish symmetrically along these
diverging migratory routes. Nevertheless, in order to further mitigate this unlikely con-
cern, the analysis establishes that the results are unaffected qualitatively if it accounts for
the potentially confounding effects of a wide range of geographical factors in the home-
land of each ethnic group. In addition, in order to further mitigate concerns regarding
the role of omitted variables, the analysis accounts for spatial autocorrelation as well as
regional fixed effects, capturing time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity in each region,
and hence identifying the association between interpersonal diversity and conflict, within,
rather than across, regions. Furthermore, it establishes that selection on unobservables is
not a concern.
The observed associations between population diversity and the extent of conflicts may
further reflect the sorting of less diverse populations into geographical niches charac-
terized by lower conflict. While this sorting would not affect the existence of a positive
association between population diversity and the extent of conflict, it could weaken the
proposed mechanism. However, in view of the serial founder effect and the tight nega-
tive association between migratory distance from Africa and population diversity, sort-
ing would necessitate that the ex ante spatial distribution of conflict would have to be
negatively correlated with migratory distance from Africa. As argued above, this would
have implausibly involved that the conduciveness of geographical characteristics to con-
flict would be negatively aligned with the primary migratory path out of Africa, as well as
with each of its diverging forks, diminishing symmetrically along these diverging migra-
tory routes. Nevertheless, to further mitigate this unlikely scenario, the empirical analysis
accounts for the potentially confounding effects of a wide range of geographical charac-
teristics, as well as regional fixed effects.
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4.3. Empirical Results
This subsection establishes a highly significant and robust reduced-form impact of ob-
served and predicted diversity within an ethnic homeland on intrasocietal conflicts within
this homeland. Specifically, the analysis explores the influence of population diversity on
both the prevalence and intensity of conflict. The empirical specifications in the ethnic-
level analysis follow rather closely the specifications in the country-level analysis, assuring
the comparability of the findings.
Tables V and VI present the results of the baseline analysis of the influence of inter-
personal population diversity within an ethnic homeland on log conflict prevalence over
the period 1989–2008. Table V conducts the analysis for the observed-diversity sample. In
particular, Column 1 establishes a highly significant association between observed diver-
sity across the 207 ethnic homelands and conflict prevalence, conditional on world-region
fixed effects.35 Column 2 demonstrates that—as depicted in Figure 5—the association re-
TABLE V
OBSERVED POPULATION DIVERSITY AND CONFLICT ACROSS ETHNIC HOMELANDSa
Log Conflict Prevalence
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Observed population diversity 287 339 276 280 276 290 286
(964) (102) (963) (945) (951) (107) (107)
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization 129 109
(063) (064)
Ethnolinguistic polarization 081 073
(052) (053)
Regional dummies × × × × × × ×
Geographical controls × × × × × ×
Climatic controls × × × × ×
Development outcomes × ×
Disease environment × ×
Sample Observed Observed Observed Observed Observed Observed Observed
Observations 207 207 207 207 207 207 207
Effect of 10th–90th percentile
move in diversity
045 053 043 044 043 045 045
(015) (016) (015) (015) (015) (017) (017)
Adjusted R2 011 017 030 031 030 032 031
β∗ 377 270 276 271 291 285
aThis table exploits variations across ethnic homelands to establish a significant positive impact of observed population diversity on
the log prevalence of conflict during the 1989–2008 period, conditional on the potentially confounding effects of geographic, climatic,
and development-related characteristics, as well as the disease environment. Regional dummies include fixed effects for Europe,
Asia, North America, South America, Oceania, North Africa, and Sub-Saharan Africa. Geographical controls are absolute latitude,
ruggedness, mean and range of elevation, mean and range of land suitability, distance from waterway, and an island dummy. Climatic
controls are the mean levels of temperature and precipitation. Development outcomes are time since settlement, presence of oil
and gas, and log luminosity. The disease environment control is malaria endemicity. The estimated effect associated with increasing
population diversity from the 10th to the 90th percentile of its distribution is expressed in terms of the change in the prevalence of
conflicts within the territory of a homeland over the years 1989–2008. The β∗ statistic is the estimated effect of population diversity, if
selection on observables and unobservables is of equal proportions, and the maximal R2 is equal to 1.3 times the observed R2 (Oster
(2019)). Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
35The observed sample of 207 ethnic homelands disproportionately represents sub-Saharan Africa. More-
over, while the prevalence of conflict in ethnic homelands in Africa is significantly above the worldwide av-
erage, in the observed sample the prevalence of conflict is below the world average, introducing biases in the
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TABLE VI
PREDICTED POPULATION DIVERSITY AND CONFLICT ACROSS ETHNIC HOMELANDSa
Log Conflict Prevalence
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 2SLS
Predicted population diversity 777 770 740 736 814 809
(628) (728) (740) (742) (962) (974)
Observed population diversity 1296
(324)
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization 035 020
(030) (036)
Ethnolinguistic polarization 046 063
(026) (031)
Regional dummies × × × × × × ×
Geographical controls × × × × × ×
Climatic controls × × × × × ×
Development outcomes × × × ×
Disease environment × × × ×
Sample Predicted Predicted Predicted Predicted Old
World
Old
World
Observed
Observations 901 901 901 901 697 697 207
Effect of 10th–90th percentile
move in diversity
172 171 164 163 102 101 203
(014) (016) (016) (016) (012) (012) (051)
Adjusted R2 021 036 038 038 040 040
β∗ 765 715 708 739 732
Migratory distance from East
Africa (in 10,000 km)
−0044
(0009)
First-stage F-statistic 262
aThis table exploits variations across ethnic homelands to establish a significant positive impact of predicted population diversity,
based on prehistoric migratory distance from East Africa, on the log prevalence of conflict during the 1989–2008 period, conditional
on the potentially confounding effects of geographic, climatic, and development-related characteristics, as well as the disease en-
vironment. Regional dummies include fixed effects for Europe, Asia, North America, South America, Oceania, North Africa, and
Sub-Saharan Africa. Geographical controls are absolute latitude, ruggedness, mean and range of elevation, mean and range of land
suitability, distance from waterway, and an island dummy. Climatic controls are the mean levels of temperature and precipitation.
Development outcomes are time since settlement, presence of oil and gas, and log luminosity. The disease environment control is
malaria endemicity. The estimated effect associated with increasing population diversity from the 10th to the 90th percentile of its dis-
tribution is expressed in terms of the change in the prevalence of conflicts within the territory of a homeland over the years 1989–2008.
The 2SLS regression exploits prehistoric migratory distance from East Africa to each ethnic homeland as an excluded instrument for
the observed population diversity of the ethnic group. The β∗ statistic is the estimated effect of population diversity, if selection on
observables and unobservables is of equal proportions, and the maximal R2 is equal to 1.3 times the observed R2 (Oster (2019)).
Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
mains highly significant and even increases slightly in magnitude if one accounts for the
potentially confounding effects of some exogenous geographical factors (i.e., absolute
latitude, ruggedness, mean and range of elevation, mean and range of land suitability,
distance from waterway, and an island dummy). Column 3 establishes that, accounting
for additional exogenous climatic factors which have been shown to be relevant for con-
flict (i.e., temperature and precipitation), the association between observed diversity and
estimation and necessitating the use of regional fixed effects, and in particular a Sub-Saharan dummy variable,
to account for these regional anomalies. In contrast, in the more representative predicted sample considered
in Table VI, the positive association between population diversity and conflict, within as well as between con-
tinents, can be identified.
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FIGURE 5.—Observed population diversity and conflict across ethnic homelands. Notes: This figure depicts
the relationship between observed population diversity and conflict prevalence during the period 1989–2008
across 207 ethnic homelands, conditional on world-region fixed effects, and potential geographic and climatic
confounders, as reported in Column 3 of Table V.
conflict remains highly significant. The coefficient estimate suggests that an increase in
population diversity from the 10th percentile (e.g., the Mamusi people of Oceania) to
the 90th percentile (e.g., the Pare people of Eastern Africa) corresponds to an average
increase of 0.43 in the prevalence of conflicts within the territory of a homeland over
the years 1989–2008 (compared to a sample mean of 0.14 and a standard deviation of
0.27). Columns 4 and 5 establish that the qualitative results are unaffected by account-
ing for the potentially confounding effects of linguistic fractionalization and polarization.
Finally, Columns 6 and 7 demonstrate that the estimates remain highly significant and sta-
ble if one accounts for a set of potentially endogenous confounders (i.e., log luminosity,
malaria endemicity, and time since settlement).
In light of the potential endogeneity of observed population diversity, Table VI presents
the effect of predicted population diversity, based on prehistoric migratory distance from
East Africa, on the prevalence of conflict in a sample of 901 ethnic homelands.36 In partic-
ular, Column 1 establishes a highly significant effect of predicted diversity on log conflict
prevalence, conditional on world-region fixed effects. Column 2 demonstrates that, as de-
picted in Figure 6, the effect remains highly significant and stable if one accounts for the
potentially confounding effects of exogenous geographical factors (i.e., absolute latitude,
36The larger coefficient estimates for the impact of diversity on conflict in the predicted sample (relative to
the observed sample) plausibly reflects the more representative spatial coverage of conflicts across the globe.
Further, these larger estimates for predicted diversity are in line with the fact that the 2SLS estimates of
instrumented observed diversity are also larger than their OLS counterparts.
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FIGURE 6.—Predicted population diversity and conflict across ethnic homelands. Notes: This figure depicts
the relationship between predicted population diversity and conflict prevalence during the period 1989–2008
across 901 ethnic homelands, conditional on world-region fixed effects, and potential geographic and climatic
confounders, as reported Column 2 of Table VI.
ruggedness, mean and range of elevation, mean and range of land suitability, distance
from waterway, and an island dummy) as well as additional exogenous climatic factors
which have been shown to be relevant for conflict (i.e., temperature and precipitation).
In particular, the coefficient estimate suggests that an increase in predicted diversity from
the 10th percentile (e.g., the Boruca people of Central America) to the 90th percentile
(e.g., the Wafipa people of East Africa) corresponds to an average increase of 1.71 in
the prevalence of conflicts within the territory of a homeland over the years 1989–2008
(compared to a sample mean of 0.19 and a standard deviation of 0.32).
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 6 establish that the qualitative results are unaffected by the
potentially confounding effects of linguistic fractionalization and polarization, accounting
for a set of potentially endogenous confounders (i.e., log luminosity, malaria endemicity,
and time since settlement). Importantly, restricting the analysis to a sample of 697 ethnic
homelands in the Old World, that are arguably less sensitive to the mass-migration in the
post-1500 period, Columns 5 and 6 suggest that the effect of predicted diversity on conflict
remains highly significant and larger, plausibly due to smaller measurement errors.
Finally, using prehistoric migratory distance from Africa as an instrumental variable for
observed population diversity, the 2SLS regression analysis reported in Column 7 suggests
that there exists a highly significant reduced-form impact of population diversity on con-
flict, accounting for world-region fixed effects, geographical, and climatic characteristics.37
37The first-stage F -statistic indicates that prehistoric migratory distance is a strong instrument for the level of
observed population diversity. The large 2SLS coefficient on observed diversity, relative to its OLS counterpart
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Furthermore, the results remain highly significant if one accounts for the potentially con-
founding effects of linguistic fractionalization and polarization in the ethnic homelands
as well as development outcomes and the disease environment (results available upon
request). In line with the results based on predicted diversity, once the potential change
in diversity of ethnic groups due to conflict is accounted for, the estimated coefficient of
interest in Column 7 suggests that an increase in population diversity from the 10th per-
centile (e.g., the Mamusi people of Oceania) to the 90th percentile (e.g., the Pare people
of Eastern Africa) corresponds to an average increase of 2.03 in the prevalence of con-
flicts within the territory of a homeland over the years 1989–2008 (compared to a sample
mean of 0.14 and a standard deviation of 0.27).
Table A.IX in Appendix A.4 establishes that population diversity is a significant con-
tributor to the total number of conflict events within an ethnic homeland during the
1989–2008 time period. Table A.X establishes the significant impact of both observed
population diversity and predicted population diversity on the number of conflicts, the
number of deaths, and the number of deaths per conflict, accounting for world-region
fixed effects, geographic and climatic characteristics, as well as linguistic fractionalization
and polarization. Further, the baseline results with respect to the prevalence of conflicts
across ethnic homelands are shown to be robust to accounting for: (i) spatial dependence
across observations (Tables A.XI and A.XII), and (ii) the use of predicted population
diversity as a generated regressor (Table A.XIII).
Finally, as established in Section SB.1 of the Supplemental Material, the baseline re-
sults are qualitatively insensitive to accounting for: (i) migratory distances from historical
technological frontiers (Table SB.I), and (ii) ecological diversity and ecological polariza-
tion (Tables SB.II and SB.III).
5. POTENTIAL MEDIATING CHANNELS
What are the proximate factors that could explain the adverse reduced-form influence
of interpersonal population diversity on different forms and dimensions of social conflict?
This section explores some potential mediating channels at the national and subnational
levels.
5.1. Ethnic Diversity, Interpersonal Trust, and Dispersion in Political Preferences at the
Country Level
This subsection examines some hypothesized proximate mechanisms that can poten-
tially mediate the positive reduced-form cross-country relationship between population
diversity and the risk of intrastate conflict, as reflected by the annual frequency of new
PRIO25 civil conflict outbreaks during the 1960–2017 time period. Specifically, it pro-
vides evidence that the main cross-country empirical finding may partly be a ramification
of (i) the contribution of interpersonal population diversity to the degree of ethnolinguis-
tic fragmentation at the country level, measured by the total number of ethnic groups in
from Column 3 of Table V, may be explained by the following two reasons. First, the OLS estimates may be
afflicted by attenuation bias due to the possibility that observed diversity in neutral genetic markers is merely
a noisy proxy of interpersonal diversity in unobserved traits that are relevant for socioeconomic interactions.
Second, in line with the interpretation of a local average treatment effect (LATE), there could be certain
ethnic groups in the observed sample that are not perfect compliers of the “migratory distance” treatment,
in the sense that their population diversities improperly reflect the legacy of the serial founder effect (due to
some degree of admixture from nonnative populations in the era of European colonization).
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a national population Fearon (2003);38 (ii) the adverse influence of population diversity
on social capital, based on data from the World Values Survey (2006, 2009) (henceforth,
WVS) on the prevalence of generalized interpersonal trust in a country’s population;39
and (iii) the association between population diversity and heterogeneity in preferences for
public goods and redistributive policies at the national level, as captured by the intracoun-
try dispersion in self-reported individual political positions on a politically “left”–“right”
categorical scale, based on data from the WVS.40
Table VII reports the findings from an empirical examination of the aforementioned
three potential mechanisms through which population diversity could partly contribute to
the risk of intrastate conflict in society. For each posited channel, the analysis presents
the results from estimating three different OLS regressions, exploiting worldwide varia-
tions in a common sample of countries, conditioned primarily by the availability of data
on the mediating variable in question. In addition, all examined specifications partial out
the influence of only the baseline set of geographical covariates (including continent or
regional fixed effects). Specifically, the analysis does not include potentially endogenous
control variables, many of which (like GDP per capita) may well be afflicted by reverse
causality from the temporal frequency of civil conflict onsets and may also be partly de-
termined by both population diversity and the mediating variable.
The analysis of each mechanism proceeds by first regressing the mediating variable on
population diversity. These regressions are presented in Columns 1, 4, and 7. All coeffi-
cients on the mediating variables are statistically significant at the 5 percent level or below.
They suggest that conditional on exogenous geographical factors, a move from the 10th
to the 90th percentile of the cross-country diversity distribution in the relevant sample is
associated with (i) an increase in the total number of ethnic groups in a national popula-
tion by 2.1 groups; (ii) a decrease in the prevalence of generalized interpersonal trust at
the country level by 10.4 percent; and (iii) an increase in the intracountry dispersion in in-
dividual political attitudes by 82.4 percent of a standard deviation from the cross-country
distribution of this particular measure.41
The latter two regressions in the analysis of each hypothesized channel establish that
the quantitative importance of population diversity as a predictor of the risk of civil con-
38Unlike measures of ethnolinguistic fragmentation that are based on fractionalization or polarization in-
dices, the number of ethnic groups in the national population is potentially less endogenous in an empirical
model of the risk of civil conflict, in light of the fact that this measure is not additionally tainted by the incor-
poration of information on the endogenous shares of the different subnational groups.
39In particular, this well-known measure of social capital reflects the proportion in a given country of all
respondents (from across five different waves of the WVS, conducted over the 1981–2009 time period) that
opted for the answer “Most people can be trusted” (as opposed to “Can’t be too careful”) when responding to
the survey question “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be
very careful in dealing with people?”
40Specifically, this country-level measure of heterogeneity in political attitudes reflects the intracountry stan-
dard deviation across all respondents (sampled over five different waves of the WVS during the 1981–2009
time period) of their self-reported positions on a categorical scale from 1 (politically “left”) to 10 (politically
“right”) when answering the survey question “In political matters, people talk of ‘the left’ and ‘the right.’ How
would you place your views on this scale, generally speaking?” Given that this variable’s unit of measurement
does not possess a natural interpretation, the cross-country distribution of this variable is standardized prior
to conducting the regressions.
41The three scatter plots presented in Figure A.1 of Appendix A.3 depict these statistically significant cross-
country relationships, conditional on the baseline set of geographical covariates (including continent or region
fixed effects). Specifically, they show the relationship between population diversity and (i) the total number of
ethnic groups in a national population (Panel (a)); (ii) the prevalence of generalized interpersonal trust at the
country level (Panel (b)); and (iii) the intracountry dispersion in political attitudes (Panel (c)).
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flict becomes diminished in both magnitude and explanatory power once the reduced-
form influence of population diversity on the temporal frequency of civil conflict out-
breaks is conditioned on the mediating variable of interest. Specifically, a comparison
of the regressions in Columns 2 versus 3 indicates that, when conditioned on the total
number of ethnic groups in the national population, the influence of population diversity
on conflict frequency, in terms of the response associated with a move from the 10th to
the 90th percentile of the cross-country diversity distribution, is reduced in magnitude by
about 5 percent (from 0.021 to 0.020 new PRIO25 civil conflict onsets per year). More-
over, the explanatory power of population diversity for conflict frequency, as reflected
by the partial R2 statistic, diminishes by 17 percent. The corresponding results obtained
for each of the other two posited mechanisms are qualitatively similar, and if anything,
even more pronounced. In particular, when conditioned on either the prevalence of gen-
eralized interpersonal trust in the national population or the intracountry dispersion in
political attitudes, the magnitude of the response in conflict frequency that is associated
with a move from the 10th to the 90th percentile of the cross-country diversity distri-
bution decreases by either 10.3 percent (Columns 5 versus 6) or 18.5 percent (Columns 8
versus 9), with the explanatory power of population diversity for conflict frequency declin-
ing by either 21 percent or 34 percent. Further, as shown in Column 9, the reduced-form
influence of population diversity on the frequency of conflict outbreaks becomes statisti-
cally insignificant at conventional levels when conditioned on the intracountry dispersion
in political attitudes.
One important caveat regarding the interpretation of the findings in Table VII is that
the mediating variables considered here may themselves be endogenous in a model of
conflict risk (Rohner, Thoenig, and Zilibotti (2013a)). Indeed, as corroborated by em-
pirical evidence from recent studies (e.g., Fletcher and Iyigun (2010), Rohner, Thoenig,
and Zilibotti (2013b), Cassar, Grosjean, and Whitt (2013), Besley and Reynal-Querol
(2014)), the unobserved historical cross-regional pattern of conflict risk may have partly
contributed to the contemporary variations observed across countries in the degree of
ethnolinguistic fragmentation, the prevalence of interpersonal trust, and the intracountry
dispersion in revealed political preferences. In particular, past conflicts plausibly triggered
movements of ethnic groups across space and reinforced extant interethnic cleavages
along with the social, political, and economic grievances associated with such divisions.
Thus, one ought to be cautious when interpreting the findings from the current analysis
as conclusive evidence of the role of these factors as mediators. In order to assess these
hypothesized mechanisms more conclusively, one would need to exploit an independent
exogenous source of variation for each of these proximate factors, a task that remains
open for future exploration.
5.2. Interpersonal Trust at the Individual Level
The proposed hypothesis suggests that interpersonal population diversity is conducive
to conflict partly due to its adverse effect on trust and social cohesiveness. This section
sheds light on this suggested mechanism, exploring the relationship between interpersonal
population diversity and interpersonal trust, using individual-level data.42 The analysis
establishes that a higher degree of population diversity is indeed associated with a lower
level of interpersonal trust, suggesting that the impact of diversity on the prevalence of
conflict could plausibly operate through the adverse effect of diversity on trust.
42The summary statistics of the samples employed by the trust analyses are collected in Section C of the
Data Supplement (posted with the replication data and programs).
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5.2.1. Population Diversity and Trust: Individuals in Africa
The analysis establishes a negative association between observed population diversity
in ethnic homelands in Africa and the level of trust of individuals (surveyed by the Afro-
barometer) who can trace ancestry to these homelands and are residing either in their
ethnic homelands or in other regions of Africa. This negative association is robust if one
accounts for (i) host-country fixed effects, (ii) individual-level characteristics (i.e., age,
gender, education, occupation, living condition, and religion), (iii) exposure to slave ex-
ports, (iv) indicators of host district characteristics (i.e., presence of school, electricity,
piped water, sewage, health clinic, and urban status), and (v) ancestral-country fixed ef-
fects.43 Moreover, the analysis accounts for the degree of fragmentation in the ethnic
homeland as well as in the host district. Fragmentation in ethnic homelands is captured
by linguistic fractionalization and polarization in these ethnic homelands, whereas frag-
mentation in the host district is captured by ethnic fractionalization in the district as well
as the proportion of the respondent’s group in the district population.
Table VIII presents the regression analysis of trust towards other individuals within the
ethnic group on the level of interpersonal population diversity in the group.44 The coef-
ficient suggests that an increase in observed population diversity within an ethnic group
from the 10th percentile of the distribution (e.g., individuals belonging to the Ashanti
people) to the 90th percentile (e.g., individuals belonging to the Sukuma people) corre-
sponds to a 0.29–0.59 point decrease in intragroup trust (compared to a sample mean of
1.52 and a standard deviation of 1.00). The analysis further suggests that ethnolinguis-
tic fractionalization and polarization in the ethnic homeland have an adverse effect on
intragroup trust.
5.2.2. Population Diversity and Trust: Second-Generation Migrants (U.S.)
This subsection explores the effect of population diversity in the ancestral country of
second-generation migrants in the United States on their level of trust (as reported in
the General Social Survey, GSS). The focus on a single country permits the analysis to
account for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity in the host country (e.g., geograph-
ical, cultural, and institutional characteristics).45 Moreover, the analysis accounts for a
range of individual controls, as well as geographical characteristics, regional fixed effects,
and the degree of ethnolinguistic fractionalization and polarization, all in the ancestral
country of origin.46
43Since a third of the observations in the sample are individuals who are currently residing in Nigeria, and
since Nigeria has the lowest level of trust among the nine countries in the sample, possibly due to omitted
variables (e.g., corruption), and since the level of genetic diversity in Nigeria is not among the highest in the
sample, the actual relationship between diversity and trust may be masked in the absence of country dummies.
Thus, all columns of the table account for host-country fixed effects.
44The classification of individuals and their association with various ethnic homelands is based on Nunn and
Wantchekon (2011).
45In addition, the focus on second-generation rather than first-generation migrants allows the analysis to
exploit the individual-level variation in trust that plausibly mostly reflects the trust attitudes transmitted inter-
generationally from parents rather than from society at large.
46Since the sample of second-generation migrants consists of 76 percent immigrants from Europe, 3 percent
immigrants from Asia, and 21 percent immigrants from the Americas, and since individuals from Europe have
the highest level of trust among these three groups, possibly due to omitted variables (e.g., income), and since
the level of genetic diversity in Europe is highest among the three groups, an artificially positive relationship
between trust and population diversity in the sample as a whole may appear in the absence of ancestral regional
dummies. Thus, all columns of the table account for ancestral regional fixed effects. Since migrants from North
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TABLE IX
COUNTRY-OF-ORIGIN POPULATION DIVERSITY AND INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL TRUST AMONG
SECOND-GENERATION U.S. IMMIGRANTSa
Trust
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Population diversity (ancestral) −147 −150 −102 −982 −123 −124
(423) (374) (448) (455) (237) (171)
Ethnic fractionalization (ancestral) 0014 00041
(018) (020)
Ethnolinguistic polarization (ancestral) −0028 −0012
(0094) (012)
Regional dummies (ancestral) × × × × × ×
GSS year × × × × ×
Baseline individual controls × × × ×
Income dummies × × × ×
Education dummies × × × ×
Religion dummies × × × ×
Region of interview dummies × × × ×
Geographical controls (ancestral) × ×
Number of observations 2294 2294 1785 1785 1785 1785
Adjusted R2 0029 0036 0096 0096 0096 0096
Effect of 10th–90th percentile
move in diversity
−103 −106 −072 −069 −087 −087
(030) (026) (032) (032) (017) (012)
aThis table presents the results of an individual-level OLS regression analysis of interpersonal trust among second-generation
migrants in the United States on population diversity in their parental country of origin (as captured by ancestry-adjusted predicted
diversity; Ashraf and Galor (2013a)), accounting for a range of individual-level socioeconomic characteristics (i.e., age, gender, income,
religion, education), as well as time period fixed effects, parental region fixed effects, and the U.S. host region fixed effect. The
estimated effect associated with increasing population diversity from the 10th to the 90th percentile of its distribution is expressed
in terms of the change in the trust variable. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors, clustered multi-dimensionally at both the
ancestral-country level and the U.S. region-of-interview level, are reported in parentheses.
Table IX explores the association between the trust of second-generation migrants and
the degree of population diversity in their parental country of origin. Column 1 establishes
a negative and highly significant association between population diversity in the parental
country of origin and trust of second-generation migrants, accounting for regional fixed
effects associated with the parental country of origin.47 This highly significant negative
association remains largely stable if one accounts for interview-year fixed effects (Col-
umn 2), and the fixed effects associated with the respondent’s age, sex, income, education,
religion, and region within the United States (i.e., where the interview was conducted)
in addition to the ethnic fractionalization or polarization of the homeland (Columns 3
and 4). Moreover, the results are robust to controlling for geographical characteristics of
the parental country of origin (Columns 5 and 6).48 The coefficient of interest in Column 4
America in the sample originate from either Canada or Mexico, where Canada is significantly more diverse,
due to a larger European population, and significantly more trustful, possibly due to higher income, the use of
a North America dummy only affects the interpretation of the results. Hence, all columns of the table account
for Latin American regional fixed effects.
47Since the sample is composed of individuals from European countries, Asian countries, and three coun-
tries in the Americas: Canada, Mexico, and Puerto Rico, the regional dummies distinguish between European,
Asian, and Latin American countries.
48The inclusion of geographical characteristics of the ancestral homeland reduces the sample due to the
absence of some of the relevant data for Puerto Rico.
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suggests that an increase in population diversity in the parental country of origin from the
10th percentile of the predicted contemporary level of diversity (e.g., individuals of Mex-
ican descent) to the 90th percentile (e.g., individuals of Austrian descent) corresponds
to a decrease in trust by 0.69 points (compared to a sample mean of 1.88 and standard
deviation of 0.97). The analysis further suggests that ethnolinguistic fractionalization and
polarization in the parental country of origin have no significant association with trust.
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This research explores one of the deepest roots of the prevailing variations in the emer-
gence, prevalence, recurrence, and severity of intrasocietal conflicts, molded during the
dawn of the dispersion of anatomically modern humans across the globe. It advances
the hypothesis and establishes empirically that interpersonal population diversity, as de-
termined predominantly during the exodus of humans from Africa tens of thousands of
years ago, has been pivotal to historical and contemporary civil conflicts. The findings ar-
guably reflect the contribution of population diversity to the non-cohesiveness of society,
as reflected partly in the prevalence of mistrust, the divergence in preferences for pub-
lic goods and redistributive policies, and the degree of fractionalization and polarization
across ethnic, linguistic, and religious groups. Future research ought to focus on a deeper
exploration of these and other possible mechanisms in order to better inform policies
geared towards the implementation of optimal educational and sociopolitical institutions
that could address the contribution of diversity to the non-cohesiveness of society.
APPENDIX
A.1. Analysis of Intrastate Conflict Severity in Repeated Cross-Country Data
The findings in Section 3.2 indicate that population diversity is a robust and significant
reduced-form contributor to the contemporary risk of conflict in society, as manifested by
the frequency, prevalence, and emergence of civil conflict events in the post-1960 time pe-
riod. However, the outcome variables employed by those regressions are based on binary
measures that are subject to a predefined threshold of annual battle-related casualties,
which needs to be surpassed for a civil conflict event to be identified as such. Therefore,
broadly speaking, the earlier findings reflect the influence of interpersonal population di-
versity on the extensive margin of conflict. This appendix section explores the influence
of population diversity on the intensive margin of conflict. In particular, it employs both
ordinal and continuous measures that capture the “severity” of intrastate conflicts and of
events related to general social unrest, including but not limited to armed conflict.
The first measure of conflict intensity exploits information on the apparent “magnitude
scores” associated with “major episodes” of intrastate armed conflict, as reported by the
Major Episodes of Political Violence (MEPV) data set (Marshall (2017)).49 According
to this data set, a “major episode” of armed conflict involves both (i) a minimum of 500
directly related fatalities in total; and (ii) systematic violence at a sustained rate of at least
100 directly related casualties per year. Importantly, for each such episode of conflict, the
MEPV data set provides a “magnitude score”—namely, an ordinal measure on a scale of
1 to 10 of the episode’s destructive impact on the directly affected society, incorporating
49The version of the MEPV data set employed provides annual information for a total of 179 countries
over the 1946–2017 time period. See http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/MEPVcodebook2016.pdf for further
details on the measure of conflict intensity from the MEPV data set.
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information on multiple dimensions of conflict severity, including the capabilities of the
state, the interactive intensity (means and goals) of the oppositional actors, the area and
scope of death and destruction, the extent of population displacement, and the duration
of the episode. The specific outcome variable from the MEPV data set employed by the
current analysis reflects the aggregated magnitude score across all conflict episodes that
are classified as one of four types of intrastate conflict—namely, civil war, civil violence,
ethnic war, and ethnic violence.50 In particular, this variable is reported by the MEPV
data set at the country-year level, with nonevent years for a country being coded as 0.
The second measure of conflict intensity is based on annual time-series data on a con-
tinuous index of social conflict at the country level, as reported by the Cross-National
Time-Series (CNTS) Data Archive (Banks and Wilson (2018)). Rather than adopting
an ad hoc fatality-related threshold for the identification of conflict events, this index
provides an aggregate summary of the general level of social dissonance in any given
country-year, by way of measuring a weighted average across all observed occurrences
of eight different types of sociopolitical unrest, including assassinations, general strikes,
guerrilla warfare, major government crises, political purges, riots, revolutions, and anti-
government demonstrations.51
Given that the current analysis of conflict severity follows Esteban, Mayoral, and Ray
(2012), in terms of exploiting variations in quinquennially repeated cross-country data,
for each country, the annual data on either measure of conflict intensity are collapsed
to a quinquennial time series, by assigning, to any given 5-year interval in the post-1960
sample period, the maximum level of conflict intensity reflected by that measure across
all years in the 5-year interval. As in earlier analyses of civil conflict incidence and onset,
the examination focuses on better-identified specifications that either (i) exploit varia-
tions in a sample of countries belonging only to the Old World, or (ii) exploit migratory
distance from East Africa as an instrument for contemporary population diversity in a
global sample of countries. All regressions account for temporal dependence in conflict
severity by allowing both the lagged observation of the outcome variable and a full set of
time-interval (5-year period) dummies to enter the specification. Further, whenever time-
varying covariates are allowed to enter the specification, they do so with a one-period
lag. Finally, because the units in which the proxies of conflict intensity are measured in
the data have no natural interpretation, the outcome variables are standardized prior to
running the regressions.
Table A.I presents the results from the analysis of the influence of interpersonal diver-
sity on intrastate conflict severity, as reflected by either the MEPV aggregate magnitude
score of conflict intensity (Columns 1–4) or the CNTS index of social conflict (Columns 5–
8).52 Regardless of the measure for conflict intensity examined, the identification strategy
50Specifically, all episodes of intrastate conflict in the MEPV data set are categorized along two dimensions.
With respect to the first dimension, an episode may be considered either (i) one of “civil” conflict, involving
rival political groups; or (ii) one of “ethnic” conflict, involving the state agent and a distinct ethnic group. In
terms of the second dimension, however, an episode may be either (i) one of “violence,” involving the use of
instrumental force, without necessarily possessing any exclusive goals; or (ii) one of “war,” involving violent
activities between distinct groups, with the intent to impose a unilateral result to the contention.
51The specific weights (reported in parentheses) assigned to the different types of sociopolitical unrest con-
sidered by the index are as follows: assassinations (25), general strikes (20), guerrilla warfare (100), major
government crises (20), political purges (20), riots (25), revolutions (150), and anti-government demonstra-
tions (10). This weighting methodology is based on Rummel (1963). For further details, the reader is referred
to the codebook of the CNTS data archive, available at http://www.cntsdata.com/.
52Despite the fact that the measure of conflict intensity from the MEPV data set is ordinal rather than con-
tinuous in nature, the analysis pursues least-squares (as opposed to maximum-likelihood) estimation methods
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TABLE A.I
POPULATION DIVERSITY AND THE SEVERITY OF CIVIL CONFLICT IN REPEATED CROSS-COUNTRY DATAa
Cross-Country Sample: Old World Global Old World Global
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS
Quinquennial MEPV civil conflict
severity, 1960–2017
Quinquennial CNTS social
conflict index, 1960–2014
Population diversity 424 409 416 398 531 562 568 611
(ancestry adjusted) (145) (180) (153) (199) (235) (198) (260) (229)
Continent dummies × × × × × × × ×
Time dummies × × × × × × × ×
Controls for temporal spillovers × × × × × × × ×
Controls for geography × × × × × × × ×
Controls for ethnic diversity × × × ×
Controls for institutions × × × ×
Controls for oil, population, × × × ×
and income
Observations 1270 1045 1576 1311 1144 924 1430 1165
Countries 123 121 149 147 123 120 150 146
Partial R2 of population diversity 00088 00062 00057 00050
Adjusted R2 063 061 0082 010
Effect of 10th–90th percentile 020 018 028 026 025 026 037 040
move in diversity (0068) (0081) (010) (013) (011) (0093) (017) (015)
First-stage F-statistic 1503 1019 1471 940
aThis table exploits variations in repeated cross-country data to establish a significant positive reduced-form impact of contem-
porary population diversity on the severity of conflict, as reflected by (i) the maximum value of an annual ordinal index of conflict
intensity (from the MEPV data set) across all years in any given 5-year interval during the 1960–2017 time period; and (ii) the maxi-
mum value of an annual continuous index of the degree of social unrest (from the CNTS data set) across all years in any given 5-year
interval during the 1960–2014 time period, conditional on other well-known diversity measures as well as the proximate geographical,
institutional, and development-related correlates of conflict. Given that both measures of conflict severity are expressed in units that
have no natural interpretation, their intertemporal cross-country distributions are standardized prior to conducting the regression
analysis. The controls for geography include absolute latitude, ruggedness, distance to the nearest waterway, the mean and range of
agricultural suitability, the mean and range of elevation, and an indicator for small island nations. The controls for ethnic diversity
include ethnic fractionalization and polarization. The controls for institutions include a set of legal origin dummies, comprising two
indicators for British and French legal origins, as well as six time-dependent covariates that capture the average annual values over
the previous 5-year interval of the degree of executive constraints, two indicators for the type of political regime (democracy and
autocracy), and three indicators for experience as a colony of the U.K., France, and any other major colonizing power. The control for
oil presence is a time-invariant indicator for the discovery of a petroleum (oil or gas) reserve by the year 2003. The controls for popu-
lation and income are the time-dependent log-transformed average annual values over the previous 5-year interval of total population
and GDP per capita. To account for temporal dependence in conflict outcomes, all regressions control for the value of the outcome
variable from the previous 5-year interval. For regressions based on the global sample, the set of continent dummies includes five
indicators for Africa, Asia, North America, South America, and Oceania, whereas for regressions based on the Old World sample, the
set includes two indicators for Africa and Asia. The 2SLS regressions exploit prehistoric migratory distance from East Africa to the
indigenous (precolonial) population of a country as an excluded instrument for the country’s contemporary population diversity. The
estimated effect associated with increasing population diversity from the 10th to the 90th percentile of its cross-country distribution
is expressed in terms of the number of standard deviations of the intertemporal cross-country distribution of the outcome variable.
Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors, clustered at the country level, are reported in parentheses.
exploited, or the set of covariates considered by the specification, the results from the
analysis of conflict severity in Table A.I establish population diversity as a qualitatively
when examining this particular outcome variable, primarily because this permits the implementation of both of
the key identification strategies. Specifically, although the main findings from Columns 1–2 can be qualitatively
replicated using ordered probit rather than OLS regressions (results not shown), the absence of a readily avail-
able IV counterpart of the ordered probit regression model precludes conducting a similar robustness check
on the main findings from Columns 3–4.
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robust and significant reduced-form contributor to the intensive margin of intrastate con-
flict. Specifically, a move from the 10th to the 90th percentile of the cross-country dis-
tribution of population diversity in the relevant sample is associated with an increase in
conflict severity by 18 to 28 percent of a standard deviation from the observed distribution
of the MEPV magnitude score of conflict intensity, and with an increase in general social
unrest by 25 to 41 percent of a standard deviation from the observed distribution of the
CNTS index of social conflict.
A.2. Robustness Checks for the Country-Level Analyses
Selection on Observables and Unobservables
Following the methodology of Altonji, Elder, and Taber (2005), the current analysis
exploits the idea that the amount of selection bias due to the unobserved variables in
a model can be inferred from the reduction in selection bias from the inclusion of addi-
tional observed variables, thus permitting an assessment of how much larger the bias from
unobserved heterogeneity needs to be, relative to the bias from observables, in order to
fully explain away the coefficient on the explanatory variable of interest.53 Specifically, the
analysis compares the estimated coefficient, βˆR1 , on population diversity from a restricted
model (conditioned on a subset of controls) with its estimated coefficient, βˆF1 , from an
augmented model (conditioned on the full set of controls), examining the Altonji, Elder,
and Taber (2005) ratio, AET = βˆF1 /(βˆR1 − βˆF1 ). Intuitively, a higher absolute value for AET
suggests that the additional control variables included in the augmented model, relative
to the restricted one, are not sufficient to explain away the estimated coefficient on popu-
lation diversity in the full specification, and as such, this coefficient cannot be completely
attributed to omitted-variable bias unless the amount of selection on unobservables is
much larger than that on observables.
The analysis additionally considers the δ and β∗ statistics suggested by Oster (2019).
The δ statistic reflects how strongly correlated the unobservables need to be with popula-
tion diversity, relative to observables, in order to account for the full size of the coefficient
on population diversity. It differs from AET by accounting for the empirical relevance of
the observables in explaining the variation in the outcome variable, based on the idea
that including observables that do not move the R2 statistic of the regression very much
leaves more room for unobservables that are correlated with the variable of interest. The
β∗ statistic reflects the estimated value of the coefficient on population diversity if un-
observables were as correlated with population diversity as the observables. Oster (2019)
showed that if zero does not belong to the interval between the estimated coefficient on
population diversity and β∗, then one can reject the null hypothesis that the coefficient of
interest is exclusively driven by unobservables.
The analysis treats the specification from Column 3 of Table I as the restricted model.
This specification includes, besides population diversity, the baseline geographical con-
53Altonji, Elder, and Taber (2005) developed this method for the case where the explanatory variable of
interest is binary in nature, while Bellows and Miguel (2009) considered the case of a continuous explanatory
variable. Roughly speaking, the assumption in assessments of this type is that the covariation of the outcome
variable with observables, on the one hand, and its covariation with unobservables, on the other, are identi-
cally related to the explanatory variable of interest. Altonji, Elder, and Taber (2005) provided some sufficient
conditions for such an assumption to hold.
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trols and continent fixed effects. Coefficient stability is assessed relative to the augmented
specification presented in Column 8 that includes the full set of control variables. The re-
sulting AET ratio is −103, and it suggests that selection on unobservables would have to
be at least ten times larger than the selection on observables to account for the full size of
the estimated coefficient for population diversity.54 On the other hand, Oster’s δ statistic
is 1.93, indicating that the correlation of unobservables with population diversity needs
to be almost twice as large as the correlation of population diversity with observables in
order to drive the estimate down to zero. Assuming that the unobservables are equally
correlated with population diversity as are the observables, and that these correlations
have the same sign, the estimated coefficient for diversity, if one were able to control for
all unobservables, would be β∗ = 115. Thus, the interval between the actual coefficient
estimate from the full specification (0.309) and β∗ excludes zero.55 It is therefore rather
unlikely that the main results could be explained away by omitted variables.
Robustness to Examining the Count of Civil Conflict Onset Across Countries
Given that the baseline cross-country regressions employ least-squares estimation, a log
transformation is applied to the outcome variable in order to partly address the issue that
its cross-country distribution is positively skewed with excess zeros, arising from the fact
that new civil conflict onsets are generally rare events in cross-sectional data. An alter-
native approach to this issue, however, is to employ an estimation method that is tai-
lored to the analysis of over-dispersed count data. The analysis in Table A.II considers
the total count rather than the annual frequency of civil conflict onsets over the 1960–
2017 time period as the outcome variable. The regressions in Columns 1–7 are estimated
using the negative-binomial (as opposed to a least-squares) estimator to account for over-
dispersion. Given the absence of a negative-binomial estimator that permits instrumen-
tation, in lieu of implementing the instrument-based identification strategy in the global
sample of countries, Columns 8–9 examine robustness to employing the Poisson rather
than the negative-binomial estimator in the global sample of countries. To interpret the
influence of population diversity, the estimate in Column 7 suggests that, conditional on
the full set of control variables, a 5 percentage point increase in population diversity trans-
lates roughly into an additional civil conflict amongst countries in the Old World during
the 1960–2017 time period.
Robustness to Accounting for Spatial Dependence
To account for spatial dependence across country observations, the analysis in Ta-
ble A.III replicates the key specifications from Table I using spatial-autoregressive models
with spatial-autoregressive disturbances (SARAR(11)), estimated by a generalized spa-
tial two-stage least-squares (GS2SLS) estimator (e.g., Drukker, Prucha, and Raciborski
(2013)). These spatial regressions involve the estimation of AR(1) coefficients, λ and
ρ, that are respectively associated with the spatial lags in the outcome variable and the
error term. To perform this robustness check, the estimator exploits an inverse-distance
spatial weighting matrix for the regression sample, based on the great-circle distances be-
tween the geodesic centroids of country pairs. Reassuringly, all of the main cross-country
54The negative sign indicates that selection on unobservables needs to move the coefficient estimate in the
opposite direction, compared to selection on observables.
55The reported Oster statistics are computed under the most conservative assumption that R2max = 1, that is,
that the entire cross-country variation in conflict frequency would be explained by the estimated model if one
could include all unobservables correlated with population diversity to the model.
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findings remain qualitatively intact, indicating that spatial dependence across country ob-
servations is not a confounding issue.
Robustness to Accounting for Population Diversity as a Generated Regressor
The measure of contemporary population diversity is a generated regressor in the
main specifications, because it is projected from implicit zeroth-stage relationships (i) be-
tween prehistoric migratory distance from East Africa and expected heterozygosity in
the HGDP-CEPH sample of 53 ethnic groups, and (ii) between pairwise migratory dis-
tance and pairwise FST genetic distance across all pairs of ethnic groups in this sample.
Table A.IV therefore checks the robustness of the standard-error estimates to account-
ing for potential bias due to the use of a generated regressor. To perform this robustness
check, the analysis replicates the key specifications from Table I, adopting the two-step
bootstrapping technique implemented by Ashraf and Galor (2013a) for estimating the
standard errors. The reader is referred to that work for additional details on the tech-
nique. As expected, the bootstrapped standard errors are indeed somewhat larger than
their robust counterparts from Table I, but reassuringly, the statistical significance of the
coefficients on population diversity remain unaffected.
TABLE A.IV
POPULATION DIVERSITY AND THE FREQUENCY OF CIVIL CONFLICT ONSET ACROSS
COUNTRIES—ROBUSTNESS TO ACCOUNTING FOR POPULATION DIVERSITY AS A GENERATED REGRESSORa
Cross-Country Sample: Global Old World Global
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS
Log number of new PRIO25 civil conflict onsets per year, 1960–2017
Population diversity
(ancestry adjusted)
021 044 031 032 031 055 060 054 060
(0066) (010) (012) (012) (014) (019) (023) (018) (022)
Continent dummies × × × × × × ×
Controls for geography × × × × × × × ×
Controls for ethnic diversity × × × ×
Controls for institutions × × ×
Controls for oil, population,
and income
× × ×
Observations 150 150 150 150 147 123 121 150 147
Adjusted R2 0029 019 021 021 036 023 039
Effect of 10th–90th percentile
move in diversity
0014 0029 0020 0021 0021 0026 0026 0036 0041
(00046) (00074) (00083) (00086) (00099) (0011) (0012) (0013) (0016)
aThis table conducts a robustness check on the results from the baseline cross-country analysis of the reduced-form impact of
contemporary population diversity on the annual frequency of civil conflict onsets, as shown in Table I. Specifically, it establishes
robustness of the standard-error estimates to accounting for the fact that the country-level measure of contemporary population
diversity is a generated regressor in the empirical specifications, because it is projected from implicit zeroth-stage relationships (a) be-
tween prehistoric migratory distance from East Africa and expected heterozygosity in the HGDP-CEPH sample of 53 ethnic groups,
and (b) between pairwise migratory distance and pairwise FST genetic distance across all pairs of ethnic groups in this sample. To
perform this robustness check, the current analysis adopts the two-step bootstrapping technique implemented by Ashraf and Galor
(2013a) for computing the standard-error estimates, so the reader is referred to that work for additional details on the technique.
The specifications examined in this table are otherwise identical to corresponding ones reported in Table I. The reader is therefore
referred to Table I and the corresponding table notes for additional details on the baseline set of covariates considered by the current
analysis as well as the identification strategy employed by the 2SLS regressions in the last two columns. The estimated effect associated
with increasing population diversity from the 10th to the 90th percentile of its cross-country distribution is expressed in terms of the
number of new conflict onsets per year. Bootstrapped standard errors, accounting for the use of a generated regressor, are reported
in parentheses.
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Robustness to Accounting for Ecological/Climatic Covariates
A nascent interdisciplinary literature (e.g., Burke, Miguel, Satyanath, Dykema, and Lo-
bell (2009), Hsiang, Burke, and Miguel (2013), Burke, Hsiang, and Miguel (2015)) has
emphasized the role of climatic factors, like temperature and precipitation, as important
correlates of the risk of civil conflict. Further, Fenske (2014) showed that ecological di-
versity facilitated state centralization in precolonial Africa. These potential confounders
were omitted from the main specifications in the interest of conciseness, particularly since
the baseline set of covariates includes a sizable vector of geographical variables that are
presumably correlated with these ecological and climatic factors.
Nevertheless, Table A.V shows that population diversity remains a significant predictor
of the frequency of civil conflict when the baseline set of covariates employed in Table I
is augmented with controls for (i) time-invariant fractionalization and polarization mea-
sures of the ecological diversity of land; and (ii) the temporal mean and volatility of cli-
matic experience with respect to annual temperature and annual precipitation over the
post-1960 time period. Likewise, Table A.VI establishes the robustness of population di-
versity as a significant predictor of both the quinquennial incidence (Columns 1–4) and
the annual onset (Columns 5–8) of civil conflict when the specifications from Table II are
expanded to include controls for (i) the aforementioned measures of ecological diver-
sity; and (ii) climatic experience in the recent past as captured by either (a) the temporal
mean and volatility of annual temperature and annual precipitation over the previous
5-year interval for the quinquennial incidence regressions; or (b) the lagged values of an-
nual temperature and annual precipitation as well as their temporal volatility over the
previous 5 years for the annual onset regressions.
Robustness to Examining Alternative Measures of Conflict Incidence
As shown in Columns 1–4 of Table II, population diversity is positively and significantly
associated with the quinquennial incidence of a PRIO25 civil conflict (with at least 25
battle-related deaths in a year) in the post-1960 time period. The analysis in Table A.VII
examines whether the same result holds when considering the temporal incidence of al-
ternative forms of intrastate conflict as the outcome variable, including the incidence in
any given 5-year interval of (i) a high-intensity PRIO1000 civil war (with at least 1000
battle-related deaths in a year) during the 1960–2017 time period (Columns 1–4); and
(ii) a low-intensity conflict (with at least 25 battle-related deaths in a year) involving only
nonstate actors during the 1989–2017 time period (Columns 5–8). The findings indicate
that regardless of the covariates included in the specification or the identification strategy
exploited, population diversity exerts a positive and significant influence on the quinquen-
nial incidence of either of the aforementioned types of intrastate conflict. To interpret the
coefficient of interest, the IV probit regressions presented in Columns 4 and 8 suggest
that, conditional on the full set of control variables, a 1 percentage point increase in pop-
ulation diversity increases the quinquennial likelihoods of conflict incidence by 1.8 per-
centage points for PRIO1000 civil wars and by 3.8 percentage points for internal conflicts
involving nonstate actors.
Robustness to Examining the Annual Incidence or Quinquennial Prevalence of Civil Conflict
The analysis in Table A.VIII checks the robustness of the baseline results for the in-
cidence of civil conflict, as shown in Columns 1–4 of Table II, to considering alterna-
tive outcomes of conflict incidence or prevalence, including (i) the annual incidence of
conflict, by examining annual rather than quinquennial repetitions of the cross-section
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TABLE A.VI
POPULATION DIVERSITY AND THE INCIDENCE OR ONSET OF CIVIL CONFLICT IN REPEATED
CROSS-COUNTRY DATA—ROBUSTNESS TO ACCOUNTING FOR ECOLOGICAL/CLIMATIC COVARIATESa
Cross-Country Sample: Old World Global Old World Global
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Probit Probit IV Probit IV Probit Probit Probit IV Probit IV Probit
Quinquennial PRIO25 civil conflict
incidence, 1960–2017
Annual PRIO25 civil conflict
onset, 1960–2017
Population diversity
(ancestry adjusted)
144 102 173 157 617 600 706 948
(426) (449) (439) (517) (331) (354) (343) (428)
Ecological fractionalization −037 −0080 −050 −039 0018 −040 −0027 −043
(046) (052) (043) (049) (027) (037) (028) (038)
Ecological polarization 087 033 109 093 024 033 041 053
(042) (050) (040) (047) (030) (042) (030) (042)
Lagged temperature 0078 00019 0067 0023 0033 −00043 0032 00087
(0027) (0034) (0021) (0025) (0019) (0024) (0016) (0020)
Lagged precipitation 018 −0042 025 015 0096 −00016 011 0086
(018) (017) (017) (018) (012) (014) (012) (014)
Lagged temperature volatility −058 −042 −036 −027 031 025 022 024
(034) (038) (031) (033) (029) (028) (027) (026)
Lagged precipitation volatility −133 −136 −050 −044 −028 −015 −057 −022
(081) (110) (060) (074) (059) (071) (060) (065)
Continent dummies × × × × × × × ×
Time dummies × × × × × × × ×
Controls for temporal spillovers × × × × × × × ×
Controls for geography × × × × × × × ×
Controls for ethnic diversity × × × ×
Controls for institutions × × × ×
Controls for oil, population,
and income
× × × ×
Observations 1270 1045 1583 1311 5452 4377 6996 5757
Countries 123 121 150 147 123 121 150 147
Pseudo R2 043 044 014 016
Marginal effect of diversity 268 187 336 298 032 031 033 045
(080) (083) (091) (105) (018) (019) (017) (023)
First-stage F-statistic 833 706 947 771
aThis table conducts a robustness check on the results from the baseline analysis of the reduced-form impact of contemporary pop-
ulation diversity on either the quinquennial incidence or the annual onset of civil conflict in repeated cross-country data, as shown in
Table II. Specifically, it establishes robustness to additionally accounting for the potentially confounding influence of (i) time-invariant
fractionalization and polarization measures of the ecological diversity of land (e.g., Fenske (2014)); and (ii) climatic experience in the
recent past (e.g., Burke, Hsiang, and Miguel (2015)), as captured by either (a) the temporal mean and volatility of annual tempera-
ture and annual precipitation over the previous 5-year interval for the quinquennial incidence regressions; or (b) the lagged values
of annual temperature and annual precipitation as well as their temporal volatility over the previous 5 years for the annual onset
regressions. The specifications examined in this table are otherwise identical to corresponding ones reported in Table II. The reader
is therefore referred to Table II and the corresponding table notes for additional details on the baseline set of covariates considered
by the current analysis, the identification strategy employed by the IV probit regressions, and the estimation and interpretation of the
marginal effect of population diversity on the incidence or onset of conflict. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors, clustered at
the country level, are reported in parentheses.
(Columns 1–4); and (ii) the quinquennial prevalence of conflict, by examining the share
of years with an active civil conflict in any given 5-year interval (Columns 5–8). The speci-
fications examined in this table are essentially identical to corresponding ones reported in
Columns 1–4 of Table II, with the exception that in Columns 1–4 of the current analysis,
the time-dependent baseline controls for institutions (i.e., executive constraints, indica-
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TABLE A.VII
POPULATION DIVERSITY AND THE INCIDENCE OF CIVIL CONFLICT IN REPEATED CROSS-COUNTRY
DATA—ROBUSTNESS TO EXAMINING ALTERNATIVE MEASURES OF CONFLICT INCIDENCEa
Cross-Country Sample: Old World Global Old World Global
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Probit Probit IV Probit IV Probit Probit Probit IV Probit IV Probit
Quinquennial PRIO1000 civil
war incidence, 1960–2017
Quinquennial UCDP nonstate
conflict incidence, 1989–2017
Population diversity
(ancestry adjusted)
162 113 171 163 245 252 225 247
(428) (548) (426) (581) (540) (641) (499) (556)
Continent dummies × × × × × × × ×
Time dummies × × × × × × × ×
Controls for temporal spillovers × × × × × × × ×
Controls for geography × × × × × × × ×
Controls for ethnic diversity × × × ×
Controls for institutions × × × ×
Controls for oil, population,
and income
× × × ×
Observations 1270 1026 1551 1262 717 670 879 824
Countries 123 121 147 144 123 121 150 147
Pseudo R2 039 039 044 046
Marginal effect of diversity 185 121 201 179 383 357 379 384
(054) (062) (063) (078) (084) (093) (091) (101)
First-stage F-statistic 1687 1132 1486 1208
aThis table conducts a robustness check on the results from the baseline analysis of the reduced-form impact of contemporary
population diversity on the quinquennial incidence of intrastate conflict in repeated cross-country data, as shown in Columns 1–4 of
Table II. Specifically, it establishes robustness to considering the temporal incidence of alternative forms of intrastate conflict as the
outcome variable, including the incidence of (i) a high-intensity PRIO1000 civil war in any given 5-year interval during the 1960–2017
time period (Columns 1–4); and (ii) a low-intensity conflict involving nonstate actors in any given 5-year interval during the 1989–
2017 time period (Columns 5–8). The specifications examined in this table are otherwise identical to corresponding ones reported in
Columns 1–4 of Table II. The reader is therefore referred to Table II and the corresponding table notes for additional details on the
baseline set of covariates considered by the current analysis, the identification strategy employed by the IV probit regressions, and
the estimation and interpretation of the marginal effect of population diversity on the incidence of conflict. Heteroscedasticity-robust
standard errors, clustered at the country level, are reported in parentheses.
tors for the type of political regime, and indicators for colonial experience by identity
of the colonizing power), total population, GDP per capita, and temporal spillovers are
all appropriately adjusted to assume their respective lagged annual values, rather than
their values corresponding to the previous 5-year interval. As is evident from the results
in Table A.VIII, regardless of the identification strategy exploited or the covariates in-
cluded in the specification, population diversity contributes positively and significantly to
both the annual incidence and the quinquennial prevalence of civil conflict during the
1960–2017 time period. Specifically, the global average marginal effect estimated by the
specification in Column 4 suggests that, conditional on the full set of control variables,
a 1 percentage point increase in population diversity increases the annual likelihood of
a conflict incidence by 1.3 percentage points. Further, the specification in Column 8 sug-
gests that, conditional on all covariates, a move from the 10th to the 90th percentile of
the global cross-country distribution of population diversity is associated with an increase
of 13 percentage points in the fraction of years with an active conflict in any given 5-year
interval.
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TABLE A.VIII
POPULATION DIVERSITY AND THE INCIDENCE OF CIVIL CONFLICT IN REPEATED CROSS-COUNTRY
DATA—ROBUSTNESS TO EXAMINING THE ANNUAL INCIDENCE OR QUINQUENNIAL PREVALENCE OF
CONFLICTa
Cross-Country Sample: Old World Global Old World Global
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Probit Probit IV Probit IV Probit OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS
Annual PRIO25 civil conflict
incidence, 1960–2017
Quinquennial PRIO25 civil conflict
prevalence, 1960–2017
Population diversity
(ancestry adjusted)
930 976 108 128 171 174 177 199
(302) (320) (312) (391) (056) (064) (057) (072)
Continent dummies × × × × × × × ×
Time dummies × × × × × × × ×
Controls for temporal spillovers × × × × × × × ×
Controls for geography × × × × × × × ×
Controls for ethnic diversity × × × ×
Controls for institutions × × × ×
Controls for oil, population,
and income
× × × ×
Observations 6280 5221 7801 6569 1270 1045 1583 1311
Countries 123 121 150 147 123 121 150 147
Pseudo R2 060 060
Adjusted R2 062 060
Marginal effect of diversity 098 097 113 130
(033) (034) (037) (046)
Effect of 10th–90th percentile
move in diversity
0080 0078 012 013
(0026) (0028) (0037) (0047)
First-stage F-statistic 1555 1037 1515 1048
aThis table conducts a robustness check on the results from the baseline analysis of the reduced-form impact of contemporary
population diversity on the temporal incidence or prevalence of civil conflict in repeated cross-country data, as shown in Columns 1–
4 of Table II. Specifically, it establishes robustness to considering (i) the annual incidence of conflict, by examining annual rather
than quinquennial repetitions of the cross-section (Columns 1–4); and (ii) the quinquennial prevalence of conflict, by examining the
share of years with an active civil conflict in any given 5-year interval (Columns 5–8). The specifications examined in this table are
essentially identical to corresponding ones reported in Columns 1–4 of Table II, with the exception that in Columns 1–4 of the current
analysis, the time-dependent baseline controls for institutions (i.e., executive constraints, indicators for the type of political regime,
and indicators for colonial experience by identity of the colonizing power), total population, GDP per capita, and temporal spillovers
are all appropriately adjusted to assume their respective lagged annual values, rather than their values corresponding to the previous
5-year interval. The reader is therefore referred to Table II and the corresponding table notes for additional details on the baseline set
of covariates considered by the current analysis as well as the identification strategy employed by the IV probit or 2SLS regressions.
In Columns 1–4, the estimated marginal effect of a 1 percentage point increase in population diversity is the average marginal effect
across the entire cross-section of observed diversity values, and it reflects the increase in the annual likelihood of a conflict incidence,
expressed in percentage points. In Columns 5–8, the estimated effect associated with increasing population diversity from the 10th to
the 90th percentile of its cross-country distribution is expressed in terms of the share of years with an active conflict in any given 5-year
interval. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors, clustered at the country level, are reported in parentheses.
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A.3. Appendix Figures for the Country-Level Analyses
FIGURE A.1.—Population diversity and proximate determinants of the frequency of civil conflict onset
across countries. Notes: This figure depicts the global cross-country relationship between contemporary popu-
lation diversity and each of three potentially conflict-augmenting proximate channels, including (i) the degree
of cultural fragmentation, as reflected by the number of ethnic groups in the national population (Panel (a));
(ii) the prevalence of generalized interpersonal trust at the country level (Panel (b)); and (iii) the extent of
heterogeneity in preferences for redistribution and public-goods provision, as reflected by the intracountry
dispersion in individual political attitudes on a politically “left”–“right” categorical scale (Panel (c)), condi-
tional on the baseline geographical correlates of conflict, as considered by the analysis in Table VII. Each of
Panels (a), (b), and (c) presents an added-variable plot with a partial regression line, corresponding to the
estimated coefficient associated with population diversity in Columns 1, 4, and 7, respectively, of Table VII.
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A.4. Robustness Checks for the Ethnicity-Level Analyses
TABLE A.IX
POPULATION DIVERSITY AND THE NUMBER OF CONFLICTS ACROSS ETHNIC HOMELANDSa
Number of Conflict Events
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson
Observed population
diversity
589 550 634 616
(183) (180) (167) (167)
Predicted population
diversity
532 437 492 516
(906) (667) (740) (780)
Ethnolinguistic
fractionalization
024 −078
(050) (036)
Ethnolinguistic
polarization
−019 −090
(043) (044)
Regional dummies × × × × × × × ×
Geographical controls × × × × × ×
Climatic controls × × × ×
Development outcomes × × × ×
Disease environment × × × ×
Sample Observed Observed Observed Observed Predicted Predicted Predicted Predicted
Observations 207 207 207 207 901 901 901 901
PseudoR2 025 033 046 046 022 045 052 052
Effect of 10th–90th
percentile move
in diversity
6122 5708 6586 6398 6038 4962 5585 5852
(2292) (2168) (2156) (2117) (1569) (1051) (1155) (1221)
aThis table exploits variations across ethnic homelands to establish a significant positive reduced-form impact of contemporary
population diversity on the number of conflict events during the 1989–2008 period, conditional on the baseline control variables (i.e.,
proximate geographical and development-related correlates of conflict). Regional dummies include fixed effects for Europe, Asia,
North America, South America, Oceania, North Africa, and Sub-Saharan Africa. See the notes accompanying Table V for details
regarding the other baseline covariates. The estimated effect associated with increasing population diversity from the 10th to the 90th
percentile of its distribution is expressed in terms of the change in the number of conflict events. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard
errors are reported in parentheses.
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TABLE A.X
POPULATION DIVERSITY AND ALTERNATIVE CONFLICT OUTCOMES ACROSS ETHNIC HOMELANDSa
Log Number
of Conflicts
Log Number
of Deaths
Log Number of Deaths
per Conflict
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Observed population diversity 604 261 201
(228) (979) (779)
Predicted population diversity 917 404 312
(192) (858) (693)
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization 055 0094 315 058 260 048
(032) (011) (142) (049) (116) (040)
Ethnolinguistic polarization −044 −017 −249 −076 −205 −059
(026) (0092) (122) (040) (101) (032)
Regional dummies × × × × × ×
Geographical controls × × × × × ×
Climatic controls × × × × × ×
Sample Observed Predicted Observed Predicted Observed Predicted
Observations 207 901 207 901 207 901
Effect of 10th–90th percentile
move in diversity
132 223 996971 1021187 94844 100805
(050) (047) (373655) (216878) (36803) (22374)
Adjusted R2 0201 0300 0241 0275 0241 0253
aThis table exploits variations across ethnic homelands to establish a significant positive impact of contemporary population di-
versity, predicted by prehistoric migratory distance from East Africa on the log number of UCDP/GED conflicts, the log number of
UCDP/GED deaths, and the log number of UCDP/GED deaths per conflict, during the 1989–2008 period, accounting for the baseline
geographical correlates of conflict. Regional dummies include fixed effects for Europe, Asia, North America, South America, Ocea-
nia, North Africa, and Sub-Saharan Africa. See the notes accompanying Table V for details regarding the other baseline covariates.
The estimated effects associated with increasing population diversity from the 10th to the 90th percentile of its distribution are ex-
pressed in terms of the non-logged levels of the respective outcome variables. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are reported
in parentheses.
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TABLE A.XI
OBSERVED POPULATION DIVERSITY AND CONFLICT ACROSS ETHNIC HOMELANDS—ROBUSTNESS TO
ACCOUNTING FOR SPATIAL DEPENDENCEa
Log Conflict Prevalence
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Observed population diversity 318 411 371 373 371 417 414
(882) (839) (826) (820) (822) (843) (844)
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization 088 080
(050) (050)
Ethnolinguistic polarization 059 056
(043) (042)
Regional dummies × × × × × × ×
Geographical controls × × × × × ×
Climatic controls × × × × ×
Development outcomes × ×
Disease environment × ×
Sample Observed Observed Observed Observed Observed Observed Observed
Observations 207 207 207 207 207 207 207
Direct impact of genetic
diversity
3280 4379 3851 3872 3855 4373 4339
(916) (936) (876) (869) (872) (917) (918)
Direct effect of 10th–90th
percentile move in
diversity
051 068 060 061 060 068 068
(014) (015) (014) (014) (014) (014) (014)
aThis table exploits variations across ethnic homelands to establish a significant positive reduced-form impact of contemporary
population diversity on the log conflict prevalence during the 1989–2008 period, conditional on the baseline control variables (i.e.,
proximate geographical and development-related correlates of conflict) and accounting for spatial dependence using a spatial au-
toregressive (SARAR(11)) model, with a spectral-normalized inverse-distance weighting matrix, estimated with maximum-likelihood
estimation, with a spatial lag of the dependent variable and a spatially lagged error. The model treat errors as heteroscedastic. Variables
relating to observations associated with the same homeland polygon are averaged and a single observation is kept for each polygon.
Regional dummies include fixed effects for Europe, Asia, North America, South America, Oceania, North Africa, and Sub-Saharan
Africa. See the notes accompanying Table V for details regarding the other baseline covariates. The estimated effect associated with
increasing population diversity from the 10th to the 90th percentile of its distribution is expressed in terms of the change in the
prevalence of conflicts within the territory of a homeland over the years 1989–2008. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
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TABLE A.XII
PREDICTED POPULATION DIVERSITY AND CONFLICT ACROSS ETHNIC HOMELANDS —ROBUSTNESS TO
ACCOUNTING FOR SPATIAL DEPENDENCEa
Log Conflict Prevalence
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Predicted population diversity 576 873 888 886 863 837 842
(645) (727) (723) (739) (731) (725) (729)
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization 052 033
(022) (022)
Ethnolinguistic polarization 00072 −00040
(019) (019)
Regional dummies × × × × × × ×
Geographical controls × × × × × ×
Climatic controls × × × × ×
Development outcomes × ×
Disease environment × ×
Sample Predicted Predicted Predicted Predicted Predicted Predicted Predicted
Observations 901 901 901 901 901 901 901
Direct impact of genetic
diversity
6041 8754 8749 7943 8439 8196 8246
(693) (751) (751) (898) (769) (760) (764)
Effect of 10th–90th percentile
move in diversity
134 194 194 176 187 182 183
(015) (017) (017) (020) (017) (017) (017)
aThis table exploits variations across ethnic homelands to establish a significant positive reduced-form impact of predicted popula-
tion diversity on the log conflict prevalence during the 1989–2008 period, conditional on the baseline control variables (i.e., proximate
geographical and development-related correlates of conflict) and accounting for spatial dependence using a spatial autoregressive
(SARAR(11)) model, with a spectral-normalized inverse-distance weighting matrix, estimated with maximum-likelihood estimation,
with a spatial lag of the dependent variable and a spatially lagged error. The model treats errors as heteroscedastic. Variables relating
to observations associated with the same homeland polygon are averaged and a single observation is kept for each polygon. Regional
dummies include fixed effects for Europe, Asia, North America, South America, Oceania, North Africa, and Sub-Saharan Africa. See
the notes accompanying Table V for details regarding the other baseline covariates. The estimated effect associated with increasing
population diversity from the 10th to the 90th percentile of its distribution is expressed in terms of the change in the prevalence of
conflicts within the territory of a homeland over the years 1989–2008. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
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TABLE A.XIII
PREDICTED POPULATION DIVERSITY AND CONFLICT ACROSS ETHNIC HOMELANDS—ROBUSTNESS TO
ACCOUNTING FOR PREDICTED DIVERSITY AS A GENERATED REGRESSORa
Log conflict prevalence
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS OLS OLS
Predicted population diversity 777 770 740 736
(628) (728) (740) (742)
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization 035
(030)
Ethnolinguistic polarization 046
(026)
Regional dummies × × × ×
Geographical controls × × ×
Climatic controls × × ×
Development outcomes × ×
Disease environment × ×
Sample Predicted Predicted Predicted Predicted
Observations 901 901 901 901
Effect of 10th–90th percentile move in diversity 172 171 164 163
(014) (016) (016) (016)
Adjusted R2 021 036 038 038
Bootstrapped standard error (713) (820) (824) (827)
aThis table exploits variations across ethnic homelands to establish a significant positive impact of predicted population diversity
on the log conflict prevalence during the 1989–2008 period, conditional on ecological diversity and ecological polarization as well
as the baseline control variables. See the notes accompanying Table V for details regarding the baseline covariates. To perform this
robustness check, the current analysis adopts the two-step bootstrapping technique implemented by Ashraf and Galor (2013a) for
computing the standard-error estimates, so the reader is referred to that work for additional details on the technique. The estimated
effect associated with increasing population diversity from the 10th to the 90th percentile of its distribution is expressed in terms of the
change in the prevalence of conflicts within the territory of a homeland over the years 1989–2008. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard
errors are reported in parentheses.
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